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ABSTRACT 
The FBI has entered a critical point in its history.  The new normalcy of the post-
9/11 world has created seemingly insurmountable challenges that highlight the need to 
further examine the FBI’s policies, practices, and procedures used to identify, select, 
professionally develop, evaluate and place leaders in its Special Agent ranks.  The FBI 
must identify its most capable leaders, set conditions for their success, and systematically 
place them in positions that will maximize their impact on the future of the organization.  
This research examines drivers and impediments that have led to the current 
methodologies used by the FBI to select and place its Special Agent leaders.  It also 
reviews the current mechanisms for training and developing FBI Special Agent mid-level 
and executive managers and explores an alternative strategy to identify, select, 
professionally develop, evaluate and place ensuing generations of FBI Special Agent 
leaders.  Finally, this research recommends specific courses of action and a new strategic 
framework, moving from a system of individual career management to a system of 
organizational career development or a leadership pipeline, to transform the FBI’s 
Special Agent leaders into standard setters within the larger intelligence and law 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Despite its long and storied history, the reality of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) today is that the Bureau is not operating at its optimum level.  The 
ongoing pattern of perceived and actual failures at such seminal events as the unfortunate 
end to the stand-off at Ruby Ridge, the fiery result of the siege of the Branch Davidian 
complex at Waco, the damage done by spy Robert Hanssen, the failure of the FBI to 
detect and disrupt the al Qaeda plot on 9/11, and other numerous examples, serve to 
underscore the need for a comprehensive examination of current FBI policies, practices, 
and procedures utilized by the agency to identify, select, professionally develop, evaluate, 
and place leaders in its Special Agent ranks.  The FBI’s current methods and procedures 
concerning its Special Agent managers and leaders can best be described as career 
management primarily based upon the desires of the individual rather than meaningful 
professional development driven by the needs of the organization.  At some level all 
failures are leadership failures and, while the FBI has made sweeping organizational and 
institutional changes in the wake of its failures, very little effort has been directed 
specifically toward addressing the underlying leadership issues in the FBI’s Special 
Agent workforce. 
The relevance and strategic implications of a poorly led FBI are fairly obvious. 
The FBI has long enjoyed the well-deserved reputation of being the world’s pre-
imminent law enforcement organization.  In addition to its responsibility of enforcing 
U.S. laws, the FBI is the lead agency charged with protecting America from terrorists and 
foreign spies. Eroded public confidence in the FBI’s abilities to effectively and efficiently 
carry out its responsibilities could significantly undermine the reputation and capabilities 
of the Bureau.  This dynamic has already manifested itself in serious debate concerning 
the splitting of the national security missions of counter-terrorism and counter-
intelligence away from the FBI through the creation of a new domestic intelligence 
organization along the lines of Great Britain’s MI-5 to handle those functions. Moreover, 
as a result of its failures, the FBI is subject to more oversight today than at any other time 
during its ninety-nine year history.  A series of Congressional oversight committee 
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hearings with titles like, “Reforming FBI Management:  Views from the Inside and Out” 
and “Oversight: Restoring Confidence in the FBI” have been held.  The Leahy-Grassley 
FBI Reform Bill (S. 1974) has been approved and former Attorney General Ashcroft 
appointed a separate Office of Inspector General to independently investigate 
mismanagement and malfeasance at the FBI.  In describing the state of the FBI, Senator 
Richard Durbin of Illinois remarked, “It’s hard to believe the situation has deteriorated 
and disintegrated the way it has. How did this great agency fall so far so fast?”1 
Review of the recent criticisms leveled at the FBI and the FBI’s subsequent 
response to criticism shows the FBI generally learns from its mistakes and responds by 
developing or changing policies and by creating new or modifying existing institutional 
or organizational structures that have contributed to the Bureau’s shortcomings and 
failures.  The revamping of shooting review policies and creation of the Critical Incident 
Response Group in the aftermath of Ruby Ridge; the further modification of crisis 
management procedures in the aftermath of Waco and subsequent success of the Montana 
Freeman stand-off; the significant institutional changes relating to coordination of 
counterintelligence investigations and security in the aftermath of the Hanssen spy 
investigation; and the unprecedented re-engineering of the FBI post 9/11 to improve 
intelligence, analytical, and information sharing capabilities within the Bureau; all serve  
as evidence of the FBI’s ability to make transactional changes to improve its ability to 
successfully carry-out its many missions. 
Transactional leadership as described by the leadership scholar James MacGregor 
Burns, is the brokering or substituting of one thing for another while transformational 
leadership involves the alteration of entire systems.2  The FBI continues to approach 
leadership in its Special Agent workforce as a series of transactions rather than as an 
essential system. FBI Special Agent managers/leaders are selected through a system of 
volunteerism in which individuals decide to compete for managerial or leadership 
positions by applying for specific jobs.  The only pre-requisites are three years of 
experience as a Special Agent and to have taken a leadership skills assessment test that, 
                                                 
1 David A. Vise, The Bureau and the Mole (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2002), 226. 
2 James MacGregor Burns, Transforming Leadership (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 24. 
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until very recently, did not even need to be passed in order to advance.  Very little 
training or formalized professional education is required of Special Agent 
managers/leaders.  Field supervisors are required to attend a week-long seminar while 
Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge candidates must attend the two-week long Executive 
Development Institute in order to advance.  By comparison, the FBI offers numerous 
professional development opportunities for Executives serving among its local, state, 
federal, and international partners; including the prestigious, eleven-week long FBI 
National Academy, the National Executives Institute, Law Enforcement Executive 
Development Seminar, and the FBI Fellowship Program.  The FBI should provide similar 
professional development opportunities for mid-level and senior executives in its own 
Special Agent ranks.   
The FBI would also benefit from the establishment of formalized leadership 
principles for its Special Agent leaders.  Established codes of conduct help drive how 
Special Agent leaders are expected to act.  The current leadership system of individual 
career management emphasizes the individual and not the organization.  Leadership 
principles refocus the energy of the individual in a way that is beneficial for the entire 
organization.  Core competencies focus on the individual, core values define the 
organization and core principles support and help guide the individual to the greater 
benefit of the organization.  
The FBI Strategic Human Capital Plan released in 2004 identifies forecasting as 
an essential element for human capital planning.  It further identifies drivers linked to 
operational impacts and organizational consequences as having implications for human 
talent requirements.  It discusses leadership initiatives for Special Agent managers 
including training programs, performance measurement criteria, intelligence officer 
certification and succession planning in transactional terms.3  While this plan outlines 
some excellent transactions that will undoubtedly improve the FBI, it falls short in 
describing or developing leadership in a systemic fashion, as an essential system from 
which all other FBI operations flow.  The overarching problem in today’s FBI is that 
                                                 
3 Ron Jones and Donna Sisson, FBI Strategic Human Capital Plan (Washington, D.C.: FBI 
Administrative Services Division, 2004), 24. 
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there is no deliberate, all-encompassing leadership plan to address the identification, 
selection, training, and education or professional development, evaluation, or 
performance measurement criteria and succession planning for a workforce consisting of 
over 12,000 Special Agents.  A comprehensive Special Agent leadership framework that 
addresses the aforementioned issues would represent a transformational rather than 
transactional approach toward fixing the problems that have plagued the FBI and go a 
long way toward securing the future of one of America’s greatest institutions. 
This thesis will argue the FBI has entered a critical point in its history and the new 
normalcy of the post-9/11 world has created seemingly insurmountable challenges that 
serve to underscore the need for further examination of FBI policies, practices, and 
procedures utilized to identify, select, professionally develop, effectively evaluate, and 
place leaders in its Special Agent ranks.  As the FBI continues to redefine its principle 
mission and navigate unprecedented strategic change, it must identify its most capable 
leaders, set conditions for their success, and deliberately place them in positions that will 
maximize their impact on the future of the organization.   
This research examines some of the drivers and impediments that have led to the 
current methodologies used by the FBI to select and place its Special Agent leaders.  It 
also looks at the current or “As Is” mechanisms for identifying, selecting, developing, 
evaluating, and placing FBI Special Agent mid-level and executive managers and 
explores an alternative or “To Be,” strategy to identify, competitively select, 
professionally develop, fairly evaluate, and appropriately place ensuing generations of 
FBI Special Agent leaders.  Finally, specific recommended courses of action and a new 
strategic framework is offered; moving from a system of individual career management 
to a system of organizational career development described as a leadership pipeline to 
transform the FBI’s Special Agent leaders into standard setters within the larger 




My greatest concern is not whether you have failed, but whether you are 
content with your failure. 
-Abraham Lincoln 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The reality of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) today is that the Bureau is 
not functioning at its maximum potential.  Review of recent criticisms of the FBI serves 
to define institutional or organizational structures that have contributed to the identified 
shortcomings and failures.  Many of these identified organizational and institutional 
issues have been addressed through policy or structural changes at the FBI.  This 
dynamic indicates the FBI learns from past mistakes and makes adjustments to ensure its 
mistakes are not repeated in the future.  If the suggestion that the FBI learns from past 
mistakes and has a demonstrated willingness to make transformational institutional and 
organizational changes is true, why does the FBI continue to find itself under almost 
constant criticism by Congress, the media, and the American public?  Are the changes 
made by the FBI in the wake of public criticism or Congressional oversight transactional 
rather than transformational changes?  As the medical metaphor suggests, perhaps the 
FBI is merely “treating the symptoms rather than looking to cure the disease.” 
The FBI has experienced unprecedented challenges in the new normalcy of the 
post 9/11 world.  Most U.S. government agencies engaged in counter-terrorism activities 
have experienced varying degrees of change.  The vast majority of these agencies have 
had change occur incrementally.  Organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) have experienced alterations in priorities and business practices, but remain 
fundamentally engaged in the same activities, which are conducted in roughly the same 
manner.  By comparison, the FBI has experienced unprecedented transformation 
characterized by sweeping and revolutionary changes.  The FBI has seen a strategic shift 
that has significantly altered its priorities, operations, structure, and personnel. 
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These necessary changes were driven internally by the vision of a new Director 
who took over his post a week prior to the attack on America and driven externally in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attack, fueled by a continuous stream of reports from the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the National Academy of Public 
Administration (NAPA), the Markle Commission, the 9/11 Commission, Congress, and 
other events and external organizations.4  
The FBI is experiencing an unprecedented state of change as it continues to define 
what it hopes to become in the aftermath of 9/11. Given the unprecedented changes 
experienced by the FBI during the past five years, does the organization possess the 
leadership and human capital to continue to guide it through its current state of 
transformation and beyond? Are the leadership structures in place adequate to support the 
new roles and responsibilities being undertaken by the FBI and its senior leaders? Finally, 
why does the development of a specific strategic goal focused on leadership in the post 
9/11 transformation of the FBI matter? 
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Failure by the FBI to successfully transform or to effectively prevent the next 
terrorist attack on the U.S. would likely have dire consequences for the organization, 
including resurrection of public debate to develop a separate domestic intelligence 
organization. Much of what has been done by the FBI post-9/11 has represented 
transactional solutions to specific problems. Taken together, these individual actions have 
served to permanently transform the FBI. If the FBI is going to continue to effectively 
evolve, does the organization need to develop a new way of thinking about its Special 
Agent leaders? Should the Bureau move away from the current system of individual 
career management and toward a comprehensive system of deliberate and systematic 
organizational professional development? What are the current mechanisms for training  
 
 
                                                 
4 Dick Thornburgh, et al., Transforming the FBI: Progress and Challenges  (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy for Public Administration, 2005), 9. 
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and developing FBI Special Agent mid-level and executive managers? Is there an 
alternative strategy to identify, recruit, train, professionally develop and place ensuing 
generations of FBI Special Agent leaders? 
Do Special Agent leaders require a new set of skills? The FBI strategic shift since 
9/11 has occurred during a time of national crisis. The Global War on Terror, triggered 
by the tragedy of 9/11, has led to intensification of the constant stream of threats directed 
toward the United States or U.S. interests abroad. This has led to the identification of new 
skills required of FBI leaders, increased the FBI’s operational tempo, created additional 
pressures, and strained limited resources. Turnover of leadership in the Special Agent 
ranks, particularly at the Senior Executive Service (SES) level, is excessive. In fact, a 
September 2005 report issued by the National Academy for Public Administration noted 
turnover in FBI SES positions at headquarters and in the field is extensive. The report 
indicated turnover in the field hampers critical relationships with stakeholders at the state 
and local levels and turnover at FBIHQ contributes to a lack of consistency and follow-
through on program improvement initiatives. Finally the report noted Director Mueller, 
who was appointed in September 2001, is the longest serving executive at FBI 
Headquarters.5  Persistent shortcomings and increased demands relating to Special Agent 
management positions has led to the development and implementation of numerous plans 
designed to provide relief for these issues and develop continuity in the FBI’s Special 
Agent leadership ranks. The National Academy of Public Administrators surmised in a 
report issued concerning a 2005 symposium on growing great leaders in government, that 
the development of strong leadership in federal agencies and institutionalizing a 
leadership culture are key ingredients in assuring a high level of government 
performance.6  These skills can only be obtained through a combination of education and 
training, experiences, and constructive evaluation. Does the current system of self interest 
need to be replaced by an overarching leadership system where the FBI as an 
organization and principal stakeholder, takes an equal or greater role than the individual 
                                                 
5 Dick Thornburgh, et al., Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital Program 
(Washington, D.C. National Academy for Public Administration, September 2005), 42-43.  
6 Prudence Bushnell, et al. Can Government Grow Great Leaders? Results of a Symposium conducted 
by the National Academy of Public Administration and Human Capital Solutions (Washington D.C.: 
National Academy of Public Administration, June 2005), 14. 
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in shaping and determining the future of its leaders? What are the drivers that have led to 
the current methodologies used by the FBI to select and place its Special Agent leaders? 
Does the current system of individual career management effectively address the five 
primary business or leadership lines of identification, selection, professional 
development, evaluation and placement or succession planning for Special Agent 
leaders? If it does not, what must the FBI do to identify, select, develop, evaluate, and 
place its best leaders in positions for which they are not only qualified, but are equipped 
to excel? How will that help shape and guide the FBI’s future?  
Finally, does developing a strategic framework to grow and place the best 
possible leaders in the FBI enhance the ability of the organization to think, act, and learn 
strategically, enhance effectiveness and efficiency, improve decision-making, and 
increase political support, the earmarks of a good strategic plan as suggested by strategic 
planning expert John Bryson?7 Are the transactional fixes already planned and 
implemented in the post-9/11 FBI, sufficient to produce an FBI led by the world’s best 
law enforcement and national security leaders? What additional specific courses of action 
or strategic changes are required to transform the FBI’s Special Agent leaders into 
standard setters within the larger intelligence and law enforcement communities they 
serve? This thesis will attempt to effectively answer these questions and provide a 
transformational framework that will allow the FBI to effectively navigate the challenges 
and leverage the opportunities presented in the landscape of the post-9/11 law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. 
 
C.  SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The research which forms the foundation of this thesis occurred during the period 
from September 2005 through February 2007.  This dynamic period of time encompasses 
significant transformational and transactional changes in the FBI.  As such, many of the 
assumptions and facts relevant at the beginning of the study changed during the course of 
the evaluation.  Research is limited in scope to the issue of Special Agent leadership. 
                                                 
7 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations ( San Francisco: Josey-
Bass, 2004), 11-12.  
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While the author recognizes the future of the FBI rests on the ability of the organization 
to conduct investigations in the new context of an integrated team where every member 
of the team has an equally important role, the role of the Special Agent leader/manager is 
unique within the organization as well as within the functions of federal government. 
Additionally, unlike most of the other core functional areas and leadership positions 
residing within the FBI, the Special Agent leader must emerge or be grown wholly from 
within the organization.  The Special Agent leader/manager presents a unique set of 
challenges for the organization and is, therefore, the focus of this study. 
Research included study and critical review of Congressional testimony, public 
statements of FBI and non-FBI stakeholders, focused interviews of select current and 
former FBI and non-FBI officials engaged in various aspects of the FBI’s human capital 
and leadership functions, and detailed analysis of various written and electronic medium, 
including magazine and newspaper accounts, various periodicals and books, published 
studies, monographs and reports, and review of unclassified internal FBI documents.  
Specific research conducted included review of reports concerning the FBI  issued 
by the NAPA, the GAO, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); Department of 
Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General (OIG),  internal FBI documents including 
electronic communications; The Field Division Organizational Analysis conducted in 
June 2002 by the FBI Inspection Division; the Executive Summary of a 2001 
Management Study of the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted by Arthur 
Anderson; FBI training Division working papers detailing FBI leadership development; 
white papers; and a master’s thesis conducted by a former FBI supervisor dealing with 
leadership development based on the professional military education model. 
This thesis has also been shaped by the experiences of the author who has served 
in the federal government for the past 24 years.  The author entered federal service as an 
intelligence officer in the U.S. Army in 1983, serving five years in a variety of staff and 
troop leading assignments in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and in the 160 
Special Operations Aviation Group (Airborne), where the author participated in combat 
operations.  The author left the military in 1988 at the rank of Captain to pursue a career 
in the FBI and served as a Special Agent (GS-10 to GS-13) for over 13 years before 
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spending the last five-plus years serving as a Supervisory Senior Resident Agent (GS-
14).  The author was recently promoted and transferred and is currently serving as a 
Supervisory Special Agent (GS-15) in the FBI Counterterrorism Division.  As such, the 
author has an understanding of the military leadership development practiced by the U.S. 
Army and unique personal insight into the internal workings of the FBI. 
The goal of this thesis is to generate meaningful discussion about leadership in the 
Special Agent ranks of the FBI.  This paper will attempt to define the topic as a strategic 
issue, one that has serious short and long term implications for the organization and an 
issue that needs to be addressed at all levels of the Bureau.  This thesis will attempt to 
limit the scope of the discussion by defining the “just one thing” that needs to be done to 
move the FBI toward an idealized strategic vision of an FBI led by the world’s best law 
enforcement and national security leaders and providing a suggested strategic framework 
for change.  It will offer some observations and recommendations for further exploration 
in order to effectively move the FBI toward a strategic vision of being led by the world’s 
best law enforcement and national security professionals.  It will not develop a 
comprehensive strategic leadership plan, nor will it fully identify or offer suggestions to 
fix all the leadership issues present in the FBI.  In the end, it is hoped this thesis will 
serve as a tipping point for truly transformational strategic change in the way the FBI 
identifies, selects, professionally develops, evaluates, and places its Special Agent leaders 
by generating meaningful discussions at the right levels within and external to the FBI. 
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II. IDENTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM 
The task of a leader is to get his people from where they are to where they 
have not been. 
        Henry Kissinger 
 
A. DISCUSSION OF LEADERSHIP 
Leadership scholar John Gardner defines leadership as “the process of persuasion 
or example by which an individual or leadership team induces a group to pursue 
objectives held by the leader or shared by the leader and his or her followers.”8 
Leadership centers on the ability to influence others.  FBI Supervisory Special Agent Jeff 
Green, Ph.D, of the FBI Leadership Development Institute analyzed the leadership 
component of change and concluded change leaders do not achieve success in a vacuum. 
Green observed: 
Change leaders do not achieve success by themselves. Extraordinary 
leaders, transformational leaders, enlist the support and assistance of those 
who must make the project work. They encourage employees and build 
teams. They motivate and challenge others to do more than they originally 
intended and possibly more than they even thought possible. Depending 
on the needs of the situation and developmental levels of their employees; 
leaders direct, coach, support and delegate. They empower others at all 
levels including subordinates, peers, suppliers, customers and their 
leaders. Leadership is multi-directional; effective leaders influence below, 
sideways and up.9 
Leadership is different than management.  Leadership is about people, whereas 
management focuses on things such as budgets, programs, and measuring results. 
Today’s leaders in the FBI must have demonstrated leadership and management skills. 
They must be able to motivate, inspire, and empower against a backdrop of controlling 
priorities, resources, budgets and personnel.  For the purposes of this discussion, 
leadership and management will be used interchangeably, as FBI Special Agent leaders 
must possess and demonstrate both excellent leadership and managerial abilities. 
                                                 
8 John W. Gardner, On Leadership  (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 1. 
9 Jeff Green, “The Leadership Component of Change” in The Police Executive (Quantico, Virginia: 
The FBI Academy, 2005), 51. 
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Pulitzer Prize winning author James MacGregor Burns described leadership as 
one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.10  Social 
Psychologist Edgar H. Schein views leadership and organizational culture as two sides of 
the same coin.  Schein argues the creation and management of organizational culture is 
uniquely associated with leadership.  He views the relationship as evolutionary in that 
leaders impose their values and assumptions on groups, creating organizational culture. 
As these views are accepted and assimilated, the culture begins to define itself by its 
leader’s values.  The values defined by the leader become the organizational culture until 
the dynamics change and environmental forces create difficulties.  According to Schein, 
this in turn sets conditions for leadership to start the evolutionary change process anew. 
Schein believes the ability of an organization to perceive its limitations concerning its 
culture and evolve adaptively is the ultimate challenge of leadership.11  The FBI may be 
experiencing this dynamic as it moves from being a law enforcement culture to a national 
security and law enforcement organization that is intelligence driven. 
Deputy Attorney General James Comey has opined about the FBI, “That’s an 
organization where the culture is very, very fixed, more so than a place like the Marine 
Corps; unlike the Marine Corps, most people spend 30 years at the Bureau. The culture 
sets like concrete over 30 years and to change that is very, very hard.”12 
The NAPA Panel on FBI reorganization emphasized the importance of changing 
the FBI culture by shifting the emphasis from the agent’s traditional values of 
independence, determination, strong camaraderie, and professionalism to one of joint 
collaboration, interagency cooperation, and information sharing.13 
Burns describes bureaucracies as a product of a conscious decision by leadership 
to organize human and material resources.  According to Burns, bureaucracies help 
buttress the status quo and serve to inhibit social change.14  The bureaucratic nature of 
                                                 
10 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 2.  
11 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership 3rd Edition (San Francisco: CA, Josey-
Bass, 2004), 1-2. 
12 Chitra Ragauan, “Fixing the FBI,” U.S. News and World Report, March 28, 2005, 20. 
13 Thornburgh, Transforming the FBI: Progress and Challenges, 12. 
14 Burns, Leadership, 296. 
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the FBI may serve to inhibit organizational cultural change.  It may also lend itself more 
toward facilitating transactional or incremental changes than to transformation. 
Leadership must have a collective purpose.  In this context, Burns describes 
leadership as,  
…the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with certain motives 
and values, various economic, political and other resources, in a context of 
competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently or 
mutually held by both leaders and followers. 
Transactional leadership as described by Burns is not just a joint effort of 
individuals acting in a collective manner, but a bargaining process to aid individual 
interests.  Burns tells us leaders can move transactions to transformations and this occurs 
when higher goals are achieved through the pooled or collective interests of both leaders 
and followers that result in significant change.15  
At this time it remains undetermined if the incremental or transactional changes 
that have occurred in the FBI since 9/11 will collectively result in a truly transformational 
change in the bureau’s approach to leadership development and the management of its 
leaders.  In conducting an honest introspective assessment of its policies, the FBI should 
evaluate its need to focus on its leaders and examine any deficiencies in the current 
processes.  To effectively assess its current policies, the FBI must first determine if the 
Bureau is broken. 
 
B. INDICATORS THE FBI IS BROKEN 
Some senior and mid-level leaders in the FBI would argue the FBI is a high 
performing organization that is well led.  While it is true the FBI has some outstanding 
and high performing leaders, the organization has been plagued with leadership failures 
over the past several decades.  Short or one-word descriptions of these failures have been 
etched into the American consciousness and the mention of phrases and names such as 
Ruby Ridge, Waco, Robert Hanssen, Wen Ho Lee, and 9/11 typically require no further 
description and serve as enduring images of spectacular FBI failures. 
                                                 
15 Burns, Leadership, 425-426. 
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The debacle at Ruby Ridge resulted in the death of a Deputy United States 
Marshall, a young boy, and his mother; who was also the wife of federal fugitive, 
Christian Identity movement advocate, survivalist, and ex-Green Beret, Randy Weaver. 
The ensuing review of FBI actions taken at Ruby Ridge resulted in disciplinary actions 
against twelve FBI employees.  One FBI senior executive was indicted and convicted of 
obstruction of justice charges for destroying documents.  The others received disciplines 
that ranged from verbal and written reprimands to suspensions without pay.  Former FBI 
senior executive Danny Coulson, who was one of the employees disciplined after 
enduring a two year suspension, later described his frustration when he wrote, “Whatever 
bitterness I felt wasn’t directed toward the institution or its people but to its leadership, 
which allowed us to sink into this sorry state.”16  Subsequent to the tragedy, then FBI 
Director Louis Freeh changed almost every aspect of the FBI’s crisis response structure 
and altered or adopted new policies and procedures to address the shortcomings identified 
by the litany of hearings, inquiries, and investigations that followed.  Freeh’s reforms 
included ending the use of rules of engagement by the FBI and relying on a 
comprehensive deadly force policy to govern the actions of FBI agents during critical 
incidents, revamping shooting incident review policies, creation of the Critical Incident 
Response Group as an integrated structure to manage crisis situations and ensure 
accountability by senior managers, and increase crisis management training for senior 
executives.17  These reforms were necessary and have probably improved the overall 
operational capacity of the FBI, but did they go beyond fixing organizational issues and 
identify underlying leadership problems? 
The siege at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas and deaths of four 
ATF agents and 80 Davidians further amplified debate about the FBI’s capacity to 
effectively handle crisis situations.  After a DOJ review, Congressional inquiries, review 
by the Danforth Commission and despite allegations of FBI cover-ups, the FBI was 
                                                 
16 Danny O. Coulson, No Heroes: Inside the FBI’s Secret Counter-Terror Force (New York: Pocket 
Books, 1999), 560. 
17 Louis J. Freeh (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), “Opening Statement before the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, October 19, 1995,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/1995-
h/s951019f.htm [Accessed November 25, 2005]. 
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exonerated of any wrongdoing.  Once again, the FBI looked at its procedures concerning 
crisis management and initiated institutional and organizational changes to better resolve 
such events in the future.  While these changes were later proven to be effective as 
evidenced by the manner in which the FBI successfully handled the Montana Freeman 
standoff, these changes also failed to address underlying leadership issues relating to the 
FBI’s actions.  FBI senior executive Buck Revell, wrote about Waco in his memoirs and 
while lauding the acceptance of responsibility by U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, 
Revell further opined. “…But we all knew the FBI should have given her better advice. 
We should have had a better plan. We should have taken into the account the possibility 
of mass suicide, and should have been prepared for the fire.”18   Did the events at Ruby 
Ridge and Waco lead the FBI to attempt to address the underlying leadership problems at 
the executive levels of the FBI?  Not according to retired FBI Special Agent in Charge 
(SAC) I.C. Smith who wrote, “But the major crisis for the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) 
was the crisis of leadership, and it was a failure of the selection process and of leadership 
that led to the events of Ruby Ridge and Waco that will haunt the FBI for generations.”19 
The specter of FBI traitor Robert Hanssen as the most damaging spy in U.S. 
history again left the Bureau in an unenviable spotlight.  Hanssen’s unveiling and 
ultimate arrest led to the usual oversight hearings and commission reports.  Hanssen spied 
for the Soviet Union and the Russians for over twenty years.  He excelled as a double 
agent and despite being uncovered and ultimately prosecuted through excellent work 
conducted by the agency he betrayed; he successfully and intractably marred the image of 
the FBI.  According to author David A. Vise, Hanssen viewed the FBI as a corrupt father 
figure, detested its hierarchy, and filled with unrealized ambition, turned to the Soviet and 
Russian intelligence services to validate his own intelligence and importance.20   The FBI 
reacted predictably and revamped its security program.  Significant institutional and 
organizational changes included institution of a nationally directed counterintelligence 
                                                 
18 Oliver “Buck” Revell and Dwight Williams, A G-Man’s Journal (New York: Pocket Books, 1998), 
428-429. 
19 I.C. Smith, Inside: A Top G-Man Exposes Spies, Lies, and Bureaucratic Bungling Inside the FBI 
(Nashville, Tennessee: Nelson Current, 2004), 337. 
20 Vise, The Bureau and the Mole, 225-226. 
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program centralized at FBIHQ, establishment of a unit in the counter espionage section 
dedicated specifically to uncovering “moles,” establishment of a security division to 
consolidate all security functions, institution of new audit and review processes including 
expanded polygraph use, expanded financial disclosure requirements, and expanded 
review of five-year security re-investigations.  Additional security related training and 
improved coordination with intelligence community partners has also been mandated.21  
While these reforms represent institutional and organizational changes that will 
undoubtedly improve the FBI’s counterintelligence posture, they do not address the 
underlying system that allowed Hanssen to continue to rise through the ranks at FBIHQ 
and placed him in a position where he had access to the most damaging material.  If the 
FBI had a viable management selection, evaluation and professional development 
program, it is possible Hanssen’s access to critical information might have been limited 
or he could have been dissuaded or prevented from spying altogether. 
The tragic events surrounding the heinous attacks by the international terrorist 
organization known as al Qaeda on September 11th, 2001, led to the all too familiar 
pattern of internal and external reviews of the FBI.  The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, 
found that despite attempting several reform efforts in the counter-terrorism arena, the 
FBI failed to implement organization-wide institutional change.  The report criticized the 
FBI for failing to implement an effective preventative counter-terrorism strategy.  The 
9/11 Commission report cited deficiencies in the FBI’s analytical capabilities, 
information sharing capacity, counter-terrorism training, legal barriers, and inadequate 
resources.22   The FBI has responded with unprecedented reforms including a 111% 
increase in agents assigned to terrorism matters, an 86% increase in intelligence analysts, 
a 117% increase in linguists, establishing or revamping existing infrastructures including 
a National Joint Terrorism Task Force to coordinate the activities of 84 Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces being run by FBI field divisions (now over 100), a terrorism financing 
                                                 
21 Robert Mueller (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), “Statement Regarding the Inspector 
General Report on Robert Hanssen Dated August 14, 2003,” 
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operations section, terrorism reports and requirements section, foreign terrorist tracking 
task force, terrorism screening center, counter-terrorism analysis section, operational fly 
teams, enterprise wide intelligence program and field intelligence groups, FBI 
intelligence bulletin and national alert system, and expansion of FBI overseas legal 
attaché offices.23   This is an impressive response to the criticism levied upon the FBI 
post-9/11 and as with the reforms highlighted previously, will undoubtedly strengthen the 
FBI.  But these institutional and organizational changes are only as strong as the 
individuals who are placed in charge. 
The FBI is an agency besieged with problems.  In addition to the events 
highlighted above, other events such as the Wen Ho Lee spy investigation, the 
compromise of an FBI supervisor in Los Angeles by a known Chinese agent, 
investigation of corrupt FBI employees in Boston and Las Vegas who had been co-opted 
by the Mafia, problems at the FBI laboratory, revelations of 184 missing or misplaced 
computers, and 449 missing or misplaced weapons due to poor record keeping and 
accountability, non-disclosure of documents in the Oklahoma City bombing investigation 
which led to a delay in the execution of Timothy McVeigh, the well-publicized failure of 
the FBI’s information technology program known as Trilogy and other miscues have 
served to undermine the confidence of the American public in the FBI.  Former U.S. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft subsequently appointed a separate Office of Inspector 
General to independently investigate mismanagement and malfeasance at the FBI. A 
series of Congressional oversight committee hearings with titles like, “Reforming FBI 
Management: Views from the Inside and Out,” and “Oversight: Restoring Confidence in 
the FBI” have been held. The Leahy-Grassley FBI Reform Bill (S. 1974) was approved 
by committee as an initiative to push FBI transformation, but has never been passed by 
the whole Congress or signed into law.  Today the FBI is subject to more oversight than 
at any other time in its ninety-nine year history.  Its failures have been spectacular, have 
had dramatic consequences, and have been very public.  At their heart, all failures are 
ultimately leadership failures and while recent reforms within the FBI have made it a 
                                                 
23 Press release concerning testimony of FBI Executive Assistant Director John Pistole at a 
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better organization, they fall short of addressing the underlying factor that continues to 
plague the FBI and keep it from operating at its maximum potential.  How can the FBI 
effectively address its problems when it selects its leaders primarily through 
volunteerism? 
 
C. EVIDENCE OF LEADERSHIP AS THE CORE ISSUE 
Leadership based primarily on self-interest and personal relationships may be a 
limiting factor for the FBI as it does not effectively provide for systematic professional 
development or deliberate succession planning. 
Former FBI Special Agent and whistleblower Mike German describes leadership 
as a problem in the FBI when he writes: 
The FBI needs to reform its management practices.  Effective reforms 
might include enforcing eligibility requirements of at least five years of 
field experience and a record of true accomplishment before entering the 
management program; ending self-nomination for supervisory positions 
and instead mentor and select effective field agents for supervisory 
positions; developing an objective test, based on FBI rules and procedures, 
for the selection and promotion of supervisors; reforming the career path 
to require supervisors to remain in one position for at least five years to 
develop competence before moving on to the next position; training 
supervisors to support agents as leaders rather than managers; or holding 
supervisors responsible for the success of investigations. 
The FBI should also empower its greatest asset: FBI agents.  FBI agents 
are the most honest, intelligent, capable, and dedicated employees in 
government, but too much of their talent is wasted by mismanagement. It 
is the hard work of agents in the streets of America and around the world 
that makes the FBI famous.  The FBI agents described in the 9/11 report 
performed admirably.  The FBI should take advantage of this resource and 
look to the agents to help the FBI reform.  Agents know more about what 
they need to conduct better investigations than any Headquarters 
supervisors, and they should be encouraged to participate in policy 
development.  Agents should be encouraged to report mismanagement and 
should be protected from retaliation.  A mandatory practice of conducting 





unsuccessful, would go a long way toward forcing managers to listen to 
the agents, identifying management failures that hinder investigations, and 
educating managers on the proper use of their authority.24 
German was a decorated FBI Special Agent who worked a number of high profile 
undercover investigations, including the successful infiltration and prosecution of a white 
supremacist group in Los Angeles that was engaged in a racially motivated bombing 
campaign.  German resigned from the FBI in 2004 in protest of what he saw as 
continuing leadership failures and amid accusations of retaliation from FBI managers 
after he became vocal about his concerns. 
Former FBI Special Agent Coleen Rowley, best known for her thirteen page letter 
to Director Mueller in the wake of 9/11 bemoaning inaction at FBIHQ relating to the 
Minneapolis field division’s investigation of terrorist Zacharias Moussaoui, also said, 
“The bureau is full of so many examples of mismanagement that agents have been 
desensitized.”  Rowley added that many qualified agents do not want to become 
managers at the bureau because of the problems they experienced.25 
Senator Charles Grassley in an opening statement for an FBI oversight hearing of 
the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on May 2, 2006 spoke of the Moussaui case as well 
when he stated, 
Protecting careers has to take a back seat to protecting the American 
people. Unfortunately we have seen examples where those priorities aren’t 
in order.  A few weeks ago, Minneapolis FBI agent Harry Samit testified 
during the sentencing hearing for Zacharias Moussaoui. What he said was 
startling.  Agent Samit said that he warned his FBI supervisors more than 
70 times before 9/11 that Moussaoui was a terrorist…In his sworn 
testimony Agent Samit described the failures of FBI management as 
“obstructionism, careerism, and criminal negligence.  
As a result, Agent Samit was unable to obtain the warrants he sought. 
Moussaoui’s computer and apartment were not searched until after 9/11. 
We can only guess whether the 3,000 victims could have been spared by a 
more aggressive investigation of Moussaoui pre-9/11.  However, it is 
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certain that those who blocked the Moussaoui investigation have been 
rewarded rather than held accountable.  The supervisor who failed to 
support Agent Samit’s Moussaoui investigation is now in charge of the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force in one of our nation’s largest cities. 
Grassley concludes,  
The FBI’s culture limits its potential for success by putting too much 
emphasis on protecting its own jurisdictional turf, protecting management 
from allegations of misconduct, and protecting individual careers.  Instead, 
the FBI should be focusing more on protecting the American people. 
We’ve been calling for changes in the FBI for long enough. I hope we are 
going to start seeing some results.26 
Jeff Stein wrote an article for Congressional Quarterly magazine questioning the 
ability of the FBI’s leadership to change the culture of the organization from that of a 
primarily law enforcement organization to a multi-mission agency that is intelligence 
driven and adept at both law enforcement  and national security investigations.  Stein 
wrote his article around revelations about depositions taken from senior FBI 
counterterrorism officials during a whistleblower lawsuit filed by an Arab-American FBI 
agent.  According to the article, the testimony of the FBI’s counterterrorism experts 
showed a lack of depth, experience, and subject matter expertise concerning terrorism 
matters. Stein reported Senator Patrick Leahy in a letter to FBI Director Mueller, asked, 
“How can we reform the FBI, if it insists that traditional law enforcement experience is 
all that is needed to prevent and prosecute acts of terrorism?”  The FBI’s public affairs 
officer, John Miller responded to the criticism by listing all the FBI’s new 
counterterrorism initiatives. Miller stated, “We can show you….all the tangibles.  You 
know-this many are hired, this many are in place, these programs have been started, these 
structures are in place.  Because it’s brick and mortar, it’s easy to identify.  The less 
tangible things are not how you change the structure of an organization, it’s how you 
change the way people think.”27 
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Clearly there is recognition in the FBI that leadership lays at the center of its 
problems. As Director Mueller testified in the above referenced Senate Judiciary 
Committee FBI Oversight hearing, 
“Finally, I know that one area of concern for this Committee has been the rate of 
turnover among the FBI’s leadership ranks. As recognized by the National Academy of 
Public Administration, we have launched a number of initiatives to address this issue. 
Representatives of the FBI’s Executive Development and Selection Program are working 
with the RAND Corporation to develop a database designed to assist SES succession 
planning.  In addition, the FBI’s Training and Development Division is formulating an 
‘FBI Leadership Training Framework’ that will provide the basis for a comprehensive 
leadership development program. 
Another piece of the FBI’s leadership development strategy is the Strategic 
Leadership Development Plan, which will provide techniques for identifying leadership 
needs and problems, articulate a program designed to enhance leadership knowledge, 
skills and abilities throughout an employees career, and relate leadership development to 
the FBI’s strategic mission in its top priority programs.  The FBI is evaluating several 
possible measures to lengthen tenure in SES positions, particularly at FBI Headquarters, 
including the increased use of retention bonuses and other incentives to encourage SES 
employees to remain in these positions longer.  With strong, steady leadership, we will be 
better poised to achieve our mission of protecting America.”28 
The solutions outlined by Director Mueller go to the core of the problem by 
identifying leadership development and succession planning as key issues.  The solutions 
outlined are in development and have not been fully implemented.  Will they represent 
the type of overarching solution required to repair the FBI’s faltering leadership or will 
they merely serve as more transactions that have a short term impact with no real lasting 
result?  How can the initiatives recently outlined by Director Mueller address the issue of 
leadership when they are not taken together as a whole system?  Do the solutions outlined 
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by the FBI Director address the central question concerning FBI Special Agent 
leadership?  The central question or issue will be explored more fully in the next section. 
 
D. DEFINING THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
One of the most common phrases uttered by FBI agents in bullpen discussions 
about the FBI’s leadership is, “The FBI is the only agency in the federal government that 
has 10,000 people fighting to stay at the bottom.”  What factors or drivers contribute to 
the reluctance of FBI agents to commit to the supervisory ranks and why is it important 
for the FBI to review its policies and practices relating to selecting its Special Agent 
managers and leaders?  What are the strategic implications for an FBI that continues to be 
poorly led?  Why is all this important? 
FBI Special Agents (SA) eschew the management/leadership path due to actual 
and perceived familial hardships, specifically inevitable transfer to the high cost 
Washington D.C. metropolitan area and additional transfers and subsequent moves as the 
candidate continues to move up in the leadership ranks.  An FBI SA manager can expect 
an average of five to seven moves, with at least two of those moves to the Washington 
D.C. metropolitan area during a career, as opposed to an average of three moves for the 
journeyman agent.  The typical path for an FBI Special Agent manager/leader is to spend 
three or more years as a “street agent” before applying for leadership/management 
positions at FBIHQ or in the field at the GS-14 level.  Assignment to FBIHQ is the more 
common entry point for Special Agent managers.  Until recently, GS-14 Supervisory 
Special Agent assignments in the field could be designated non-stationary or stationary. 
Non-stationary candidates could be selected Bureau wide, while stationary jobs were for 
candidates serving in that particular FBI field division.  FBI Special Agents in Charge 
(SAC’s) could designate 50% of their supervisory positions as stationary.  Typically, 
stationary positions went to senior agents who demonstrated exceptional leadership 
potential.  As of 2004, all GS-14 jobs were awarded with a five-year term limitation that 
required the candidate continue to move up in the organization or return to investigative 
duties when their term is completed.  This step was enacted to ostensibly create 
movement between FBIHQ and field supervisory jobs. 
 19
Several FBI SA’s and SSA’s view FBIHQ assignments as unrewarding, 
particularly at the GS-14 level, due to the fact that, while they are given a lot of 
responsibility, they have very little authority.  Furthermore, they lose the autonomy they 
enjoyed in the field and some of the privileges, such as an assigned government vehicle. 
Consequently, the FBI has in recent years had a very difficult time filling GS-14 and GS-
15 vacancies at FBIHQ.  The FBI has taken unprecedented measures to attract qualified 
individuals to FBIHQ including a recently implemented program which brings SA’s to 
FBIHQ on a temporary duty basis for eighteen months as term GS-14’s.  While this 
program has filled critical vacancies, it has done little else.  This will be discussed in 
greater detail below in the section that explores comprehensive solutions. 
Whether the entry supervisory job is at FBIHQ or in the field, the SSA must 
complete the opposite assignment to become eligible for promotion to an Assistant 
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) position at the GS-15 level.  Other non-ASAC GS-15 
positions do not require time as a field supervisor.  Upon completion of GS-14 level 
assignments the manager/leader can apply for GS-15 positions at FBIHQ (Unit Chief and 
Assistant Section Chief jobs) or if the individual has completed a command assignment 
in the field as a GS-14 supervisor and is inspection certified (e.g., served as an assistant 
inspector in place or done a tour at the FBI’s inspection division), the candidate may 
apply for an ASAC position.  Upon successful completion of a second leadership tour in 
the field this time as an ASAC, the individual is eligible to compete for SES jobs at 
FBIHQ or in the field as a Special Agent in Charge. 
The financial compensation packages for FBI leaders/managers do not represent a 
significant increase in benefits over the senior journeyman agent level, particularly when 
taken over the course of a career and in the context of the potential additional expenses 
related to numerous additional relocations.  Furthermore, federal salaries at the non-SES 
level are subject to a cap and a GS-13 with enough years of service can get to the salary 
cap.  Their retirement income will be very close to the retirement income of a GS-15 who 
is also capped by law and may have endured twice as many transfers.  The September 
2005 NAPA report on transforming the FBI’s human capital program opines, “Numerous 
agents are pay capped and the lack of effective pay incentives to encourage agents to 
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move to high cost areas is contributing to high vacancy rates in cities, especially 
Washington, D.C., with critical staffing needs.”29  This is a tremendous disincentive for 
many agents. 
The relevance and importance of a discussion concerning the identification, 
selection, development, evaluation and placement of FBI leaders revolves around the 
awesome responsibility the FBI has to the American public.  It is a multi-mission agency 
whose long history has shown an ability to adapt to changing threats.  Today the threats 
to American society are among the most complicated and egregious ever faced.  We live 
in an era of globalization that has left us vulnerable to wide ranging threats.  Americans 
are no longer protected by the oceans surrounding them.  The advent of air travel and the 
Internet has changed the very nature of crime and terrorism.  The FBI made its reputation 
through its expertise in the investigation of interstate crime.  Today, the FBI must become 
adept at investigating in a transnational environment. FBI Director Robert Mueller 
succinctly described the nature of the FBI’s current operating environment in a speech 
before the Council on Foreign Relations when he said, 
Technology and travel have made the world smaller than ever.  Criminal 
activity not only crosses state lines, it traverses international boundaries at 
the stroke of a computer key. Crime is more diverse than ever before. It 
includes terrorism, corporate fraud, illegal weapons trade, and the 
trafficking of human beings.  
And there is a growing convergence of these threats both old and new.  
We see organized crime laundering money for drug groups. Drug groups 
selling weapons to terrorists. Terrorists committing white-collar fraud to 
raise money for their operations.  
Today's threat is increasingly asymmetrical and complex.  During the Cold 
War, the United States had in the Soviet Union a relatively predictable 
enemy which it fought in relatively predictable ways.  Like chess, it was 
complicated, but there were only two sides and a limited number of moves 
available to each.  Now, the dynamic more closely resembles the latest 
computer game than an old-fashioned chess game.  
 
                                                 
29  Thornburgh, Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital Program, 35-36. 
 21
The international threat of criminal and terrorist organizations is the 
product of the modern world in which we live.  Today, terrorists and 
criminals use sophisticated business practices to achieve their goals, not 
unlike that of legitimate multinational corporations.30 
FBI managers and leaders must develop both subject matter expertise and have an 
overall understanding of all FBI investigative programs, techniques, and capabilities to 
remain effective in the modern era of the FBI.  They must also demonstrate soft 
leadership skills identified as the eight core competencies listed below:31 
(1)  Leadership:  The ability to motivate and inspire others; to develop and 
mentor others; to gain respect, confidence, and loyalty of others; to 
articulate vision, give guidance, and direct others in accomplishing goals. 
(2)  Interpersonal Ability: The ability to deal effectively with others; to 
establish and maintain rapport with management, colleagues, and 
subordinates; to treat others with respect and courtesy; and to recognize 
and show sensitivity to differences in the needs and concerns of others. 
(3)  Liaison: The ability to establish contacts and to interact effectively with 
federal, state, and local investigative agencies; government officials, the 
media; the community (business, academic, local); internal Bureau 
contacts; and other organizations and agencies. 
(4)  Organizing and Planning: The skill to establish priorities, timetables, 
and goals/objectives; to structure a plan of action for self and/or others; 
and to develop tactical and strategic plans. 
(5)  Problem Solving/Judgment: The ability to critically evaluate conditions, 
events, and alternatives; to identify problems, causes and relationships; to 
base decisions or recommendations on sound data or sound reasoning; and 
to formulate  objective opinions. Included is the ability to make effective 
decisions without  undue hesitancy, to defend decisions when 
challenged, and to accept responsibility for decisions made. 
(6)  Flexibility/Adaptability: The ability to respond positively to and 
successfully manage changes at work; to willingly accept new priorities, 
procedures, or goals; to adapt to unanticipated problems or conflicts; to 
respond positively and productively to work challenges.    
(7)  Initiative: The ability and willingness to begin projects/work or to address 
issues/problems; to persist and follow through to complete all aspects of 
work; to respond proactively/creatively to problems/issues/tasks. 
                                                 
30 Robert Mueller (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), “Speech to Council on Foreign 
Relations, June 22, 2004,” http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech062204.htm [Accessed November 
25, 2005]. 
31 Larry G. Nicholson, “A Survey of External Executive Leadership Programs,” (Quantico, Virginia: 
FBI Academy, 2003) working papers. 
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(8) Communications: The skill to express  thoughts and ideas clearly, 
concisely, persuasively, and effectively orally and in writing; to interpret 
and understand verbal or written communications; and to tailor the 
communication to the experience, exposure, or expertise of the recipient.  
The core competencies for FBI leaders listed above are the results of a job task 
analysis performed by the FBI Executive Development and Selection Program (EDSP) in 
1991 and re-validated in 2002. 
These competencies are in addition to mastering the ten core competencies 
previously demonstrated at the Special Agent (GS-10 to GS-13) level, identified as:  
(1)  Writing Effectively 
(2)  Organizing, Planning, and Coordinating 
(3)  Communicating Orally 
(4)  Relating Effectively with Others 
(5)  Attending to Detail 
(6)  Critical Thinking and Information Evaluation/Judgment and Decision 
Making 
(7)  Initiative and Motivation 
(8)  Adapting to Changing Situations 
(9)  Maintaining a Professional Image 
(10)  Physical Requirements  
So how does the FBI measure the core competencies, subject matter expertise, 
and leadership potential of its future Special Agent leaders and managers?  They 
basically take your word for it. 
The current or “As Is” system of leadership development in the FBI is a system 
based on volunteerism, individual desires, and personal relationships.  It is application 
based whereby an individual interested in moving up submits an application listing his or 
her qualifications that is verified by individuals chosen by the applicant.  Under this 
system, some excellent leaders emerge; however, this occurs in a happenstance manner 
with little regard for the overarching needs of the organization.   
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Wouldn’t the FBI benefit more from a system that is evaluation based?  What if 
the FBI instituted a system that identified its highest potential individuals and encouraged 
them to become leaders?  What if the FBI competitively selected, provided continuous 
professional development at all levels of leadership, constantly evaluated, provided 
constructive developmental feedback and intelligently placed its leaders in positions 
where they would have the most benefit to the organization?  If the FBI is to achieve a 
strategic vision of being led by the world’s best law enforcement and national security 
leaders, what strategic actions must the organization take?  The central question to be 
asked and answered is should the FBI move from the current or “As Is” system of 
individual career management to a future “To Be” system of institutional professional 
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III.  UNDERSTANDING THE RELEVANCE AND STRATEGIC 
IMPLICATIONS 
The best vision is insight. 
        -Malcolm S. Forbes 
 
A. ANALYSIS OF FBI STAKEHOLDERS AND POST-9/11 STRATEGIC 
SHIFT 
Why is a strategic change important?  What are the factors, forces, and drivers 
pushing the FBI toward a strategic shift? Figure 1 graphically depicts the many different 
internal and external stakeholders having a vested interest in how well the FBI is led.32    
 
Figure 1. Stakeholder Analysis (After Bryson, Creating and Implementing Your Own 
Strategic Plan: A Workbook For Public and Nonprofit Organizations 2nd 
Edition) 
                                                 
32 John M. Bryson and Farnum K. Alston, Creating an Implementing Your Own Strategic Plan: A 
Workbook For Public and Nonprofit Organizations 2nd Edition (San Francisco: Josey Bass, 2005), 57. 
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Internal stakeholders or those stakeholders residing within the FBI include the 
FBI employees and the individuals directly impacted by the FBI’s leadership, specifically 
the families of FBI employees.  Internal stakeholders include FBI executives, FBI leaders 
and managers, FBI Special Agents, FBI non-agent employees, contract employees and 
special interest groups such as the FBI agent’s association that collectively constitute the 
FBI.  
External stakeholders, on the other hand, are those individuals and entities whose 
operations, interests, or environment are impacted in some way by the FBI.  They include 
a much broader and more diverse group. Some are impacted directly by the FBI on a day-
to-day basis while others are impacted infrequently or indirectly.  They include the FBI’s 
traditional law enforcement partners, the FBI’s traditional adversaries, and the people the 
FBI depends upon to effectively carry out its many missions.  External stakeholders have 
a vested interest in the overall functioning of the FBI and as such can put pressure on the 
organization to change.  External stakeholders can be powerful allies and can also 
become powerful foes.  The relationships the FBI fosters with its external stakeholders 
can influence its future. Failure by the organization to recognize the importance or to 
create trust with its external stakeholders could have disastrous consequences for the 
Bureau.  The ability of the FBI to influence its external stakeholders in a positive way 
cannot be overemphasized, particularly during periods of strategic change such as is 
occurring right now.  The FBI is in the midst of an unprecedented strategic shift triggered 
by the tragic events of 9/11 and the call by internal and external stakeholders to 
transform. 
External stakeholder Ed Stephenson of the National Academy of Public 
Administration has conducted extensive research concerning the FBI’s transformation in 
the post-9/11 world and provided the following observations: 
“The Bureau continues to be faced with the need to transform its basic culture 
from the preeminent criminal investigative organization to an organization focused on 
counter-terrorism and intelligence.  An important component in this transformation is the 
development of its leaders…A leadership development program must be multi-faceted to 
include challenging assignments, learning from others, going through crises or hardships, 
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and other ways.  Classroom training results in only ten percent of the development 
needed for effective leadership.  Again, the most important thing the Bureau can do is to 
develop a strong succession planning program that identifies potential leaders early in 
their career, ensures they have the needed assignments and training, and then ensures 
they stay with the Bureau through incentives and positive rewards programs.”33 
Figure 2 below graphically depicts the FBI’s strategic shift: 
 
Figure 2. FBI Strategic Shift (After Briefing Slides Presented at the FBI Executive 
Development Institute, Quantico, Virginia, August 2006) 
 
The FBI’s strategic shift is defined by a scope that is now global in nature with an 
increased presence overseas to combat the existing transnational threats of crime, 
terrorism, and hostile intelligence services.  Indicators of the FBI’s ability to adapt to this 
new threat include the expansion of the FBI’s Legal attaché program to over 60 offices, 
the embedding of FBI agents in military operations being conducted worldwide as part of 
the Global War on Terror, and the increasingly common deployment of FBI agents 
                                                 
33 Edward Stephenson, interview by the author via telephone and e-mail, Washington, D.C., February 
8, 2007. 
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outside of the U.S. to conduct transnational investigations.  It naturally follows that the 
change in scope requires new skills on the part of FBI agents and their leaders.  FBI 
employees must have a better understanding of the global environment, including cultural 
sensitivities and language abilities to effectively operate.  Leaders must understand the 
nuances of diplomatic relations and be adept at forging non-traditional alliances in 
foreign environments. 
The shift of the FBI from a case-driven to threat-driven organization requires 
increased intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities as a risk or 
threat-driven focus is naturally fueled and dictated by intelligence requirements and 
handling.  Leaders must have an understanding of the intelligence cycle, intelligence 
collection, dissemination and reporting requirements and experience in focusing 
resources based upon the identified threat. 
The new emphasis the FBI places on being a full partner in the interagency 
process requires Special Agent leaders to become more adept at developing relationships 
with traditional and non-traditional partners within and outside of government.  Unlike 
the law enforcement culture, many of these partners may have distinct cultures of their 
own that enlightened FBI leaders will need to understand in order to be effective.  Future 
leaders would benefit from exposure to different organizational cultures and that has 
tremendous implications for how the FBI should develop its next several generations of 
leaders, to include the possible mandating of interagency assignments for the highest 
potential leaders. 
Moving from an Agent-centric approach to investigations where the agent sets the 
course of the investigation and other employees support his or her efforts to an integrated 
team approach will likely present a tremendous challenge for FBI Special Agent leaders. 
When Maureen Baginski, a former executive at the National Security Agency, came to 
the FBI as the architect of the newly created FBI National Security Branch, she was 
reported to have observed, “At the FBI, there’s agents, and there’s furniture.”34  Today’s 
FBI requires an integrated team approach where intelligence analysts, computer 
specialists, linguists, other professional support employees, and agents all work together                                                  
34 Stein, “Under the Gun,” 1156. 
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in a coordinated approach that is intelligence-driven .  All this must be choreographed by 
an astute leader who understands and values the individual contributions of each of the 
elements of the team.  Leading diversified teams of employees with different skills, some 
of which are highly technical, will require new skills for future FBI leaders.  
Finally, while tenure is important in the establishment of a baseline of 
experiences, it should not be the basis for staffing in the new FBI.  Staffing needs to be 
tied directly to the demonstrated capabilities of the individuals selected for jobs within 
the organization.  Capabilities should be measured by a combination of education, 
training, meaningful experiences and fair evaluation.  Staffing should ultimately be 
driven by the overarching needs of the organization and not the desires of individuals so 
the FBI places the right person with the right skills in the right place at the right time. 
 
B. DEFINING THE CENTRAL QUESTION AS A STRATEGIC ISSUE 
Why is the development of a new way of looking at leadership important to the 
FBI?  The Bureau has undergone enterprise-wide change in the aftermath of 9/11.  Its 
missions are being redefined and the priorities of the organization have changed 
dramatically.  Exceptional leadership is fundamental to changing organizations and the 
future of the FBI will likely see a need for the organization to remain resilient while 
having a tremendous capacity to adapt to changing environments.  Leadership is a 
fundamental issue and critical challenge for the FBI.  In order to define leadership as a 
strategic issue central to the survival of the organization, it is important to differentiate 
between issues that are operational, that is specific issues that can be addressed 
incrementally or by enacting specific transactions to repair a gap in an individual practice 
and those issues that are truly strategic in that they impact all programs, business 
practices or leadership lines, and the overall identity of the organization.  Table 1 helps 
define leadership as a strategic issue by asking critical questions and reviewing the 





Table 1.  Framing FBI Special Agent Leadership as a Strategic Issue (After Bryson, 





The table graphically depicts primarily operational issues in blue, issues that are 
both strategic and operational in green and predominantly strategic issues as yellow. In 
doing so, Table 1 frames the issue of FBI Special Agent leadership as an organizational 
strategic issue for the FBI.35 
The overall issue is defined as strategic and therefore requires a strategic 
framework to address.  The problem impacts the entire organization, involves a large 
number of stakeholders inside and external to the FBI, is an issue currently challenging 
the organization and is one that will likely challenge the FBI well into the future.  The 
issue of leadership is certainly on the Director’s agenda as evidenced by ongoing 
initiatives relative to the Bureau’s human resources capacity including organizational 
changes such as the creation of a human resources branch under an Executive Assistant 
Director that encompasses previously separate functions that were under the 
Administrative Services division and the Training and Development Division.  Other 
changes implemented by the Director have included numerous programs such as term 
limits for supervisory special agents and eighteen month temporary duty assignments of 
term supervisory special agents to FBI Headquarters designed to encourage the 
development of FBI special agent supervisors, managers, and leaders as well as 
encourage individuals to consider serving in the leadership ranks of the FBI.  The 
implementation of these transactional fixes to the FBI’s leadership woes has had mixed 
results and the issue of leadership remains one that has no obvious solution.  Resolution 
of the issue will likely require development of new programs or approaches, may require 
significant funding or reallocation of existing funding, will likely result in additional 
changes in staff, technologies and facilities, and could require legislative actions.  The 
issue will likely require the support and attention of the highest levels of executive 
management in the FBI and is essential to the future of the organization as the 
consequences for not getting the FBI’s leadership framework in order would likely 
include significant organizational restructuring, mission change or even mission loss. 
 
                                                 
35 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 175. 
 33
C. ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIAL AGENT WORKFORCE AND 
LEADERSHIP POOL 
What does the current FBI Special Agent leadership pool look like?  Is it full of 
eager, yet inexperienced self-promoters?  What is the all-volunteer workforce made up of 
and how is it dispersed throughout the FBI?  Finally, how has the workforce evolved or 
changed during the past decade and what are the potential implications of this change? 
This section will attempt to answer these questions and provide a detailed analysis of the 
current Special Agent leadership workforce.  
The table below depicts the growth in Special Agent resources within the FBI 
over the past ten years. 
 
Table 2. FBI Special Agent Workforce Comparison  
 
A review of the above chart reveals the FBI’s total cadre of Special Agents has 
increased by around 15% over the last ten years while its leadership has grown by 71 % 
at the mid-level, GS-14 and GS-15 ranks. Interestingly, the number of Senior Executive 
Service level jobs for FBI Special Agents has declined by 14 % during the last ten years. 
A look at the Special Agent leadership during 2001 shows the number of special agent  
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leadership jobs at around 24% or one quarter of the total agent population of the FBI. 
Today, approximately 30% of the total FBI agent population is in a management or 
leadership position at the GS-14 grade or above. This seems excessive. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Age and Years of Experience for FBI Supervisory Special 
Agents (GS-14)  
 
In looking at the chart above, it appears 38 % of the GS-14 Supervisory Special 
Agent workforce is older than 45 years and will be eligible to retire within the next five 
years. 36  This chart also shows a great deal of experience at the mid-level supervisory 
ranks with 1796 of the 2433 or 74% of GS-14 supervisors having ten years or more on 
the job.  
                                                 
36 Data for Tables 2 to 6 was provided by the National Association for Public Administration. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Age and Years of Experience for FBI Supervisory Special 
Agents (GS-15)  
 
Like Table 3, the Table 4 above shows an experienced managerial workforce in 
the FBI. 391 of 543 or 72 % of FBI GS-15 mid-level managers have 15 or more years of 
experience.  The number of supervisors serving at the GS-15 level with less than ten 
years in the FBI is a little surprising and probably represents the recent practice of 
allowing FBIHQ supervisors to compete for FBIHQ GS-15 jobs prior to serving as a field 
supervisor.  This may save a manager/leader a move back to the Washington D.C. 
metropolitan area, but is it in the best interest for the organization to promote an 
individual to a higher level position with greater responsibilities at the GS-15 level 
without having proven themselves capable as a field supervisor?  This does not seem to 
follow a logical developmental model as in the past, GS-15 level supervisors serving as 
Unit Chiefs at FBIHQ had all been field supervisors and were in the process of preparing 
for their next job as an Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC).  The current practice 
of allowing GS-14 FBIHQ supervisors to compete for a Unit Chief Job without having 
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been field supervisors creates the potential of having individuals rate other GS-15 
employees who have already held field supervisory positions and will be eligible to 
compete for ASAC jobs in the very near future.  Raters who are rating officials for 
individuals that have already held the position the rater is going to does not seem to have 
a logical professional development sequence in mind. 
 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Age and Years of Experience for FBI Senior Executives 
(SES)  
 
A review of the Table 5 above shows the majority of FBI SES Special Agent 
leaders, or around 86% are older than 45 years and are eligible to retire in five years or 
less.  It also shows an extremely experienced workforce with all but two of the total SES 
employees serving for 15 years or more in the FBI. Viewed in context, having this large a 
percentage of SES employees at the retirement eligibility age should not be disturbing. In 
fact, all of the more than 350 General Officers in the United States Army are technically 
eligible to retire.  The Army has designed its succession planning so that officers are 
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selected for the General Officer ranks after reaching retirement eligibility.  Upon being 
selected they are required to commit to a minimum number of years of additional service 
at the General Officer ranks.  As long as there is a full pipeline of qualified leaders ready 
to step in at the SES levels of the FBI, which based on the tables above is apparently the 
case, having such a large percentage at or close to retirement age should not be 
disturbing.  A larger problem is the problem relating to inducing leaders at the SES level 
to continue their service to the FBI beyond reaching their “high three” salary at the SES 
level. 
So why is there such concern by internal and external stakeholders about the 
excessive turnover of FBI executives?  Perhaps the key phrase is “qualified” leaders.  Has 
the organization prepared the leaders in the pipeline for the complex challenges of 
leading an organization?  Just because there are the right numbers of potential applicants 
doesn’t mean the existing candidates possess the right education, background, skills, 
knowledge, and experiences to be effective.  And if the organization does not have 
enough qualified leaders, what can and should it do to start growing or developing them? 
According to NAPA, “…The median tenure in the current assignment of Special 
Agents-in-Charge (SAC) of FBI field offices is only 15 months, while that of current SES 
assignments in headquarters assignments is just 13 months.  The FBI needs greater 
leadership stability and experience to support effective transition…various FBI 
executives say that the minimum tenure of SAC’s should be 36 months, although there 
can be exceptions.  These officials explain that any shorter tenure hampers field office 
consistency and makes it extremely difficult to develop effective relationships with state 
and local officials-a key role for SAC’s.  Several FBI officials say the headquarters 
executives need three to five years to ensure management initiatives are implemented.”37 
Jim Trinka, PhD., recently served as the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Training 
and Development Division.  Trinka believes the FBI relies too much on what he refers to 
as the “Hero” model of leadership. When asked if he felt the FBI had enough leaders in 
its queue to effectively fill the SES ranks of the FBI, Trinka responded,  
                                                 
37 Thornburgh, Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital Program, 42-43. 
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…the FBI has many "hero leaders," but not enough to go around.  The few 
that perform well in that role get burned out by the 18-20 hour days, the 
heavy weight of responsibility, and the constant scrutiny involved by 
undertaking that leadership style.  It's not a "wrong" style, it's just difficult 
to maintain throughout an entire career and difficult to attain for those few 
who do aspire to leadership ranks.  The solution lies in identifying a 
"desired" leadership model to ensure FBI future success and then 
developing the leadership competencies related to that style in all current 
and prospective leaders.  Then the style must be reinforced by 
performance management practices, leadership career board selections, 
and other bonus/reward calculations.38 
Dr. Christopher Bellavita, a professor at the United States Naval Postgraduate 
School describes the framework of a “Hero’s Journey” to analyze the experiences of 
administrators who helped revitalize the public sector.  Bellavita looked at several public 
administrators who overcame obstacles to achieve success and observed each of the 
administrators embarked on a similar “journey” to reach accomplishment beyond what 
was expected.  Bellavita opined the metaphor of the “Hero’s journey” can provide a 
model for other administrators to emulate.39  Bellavita and Trinka both talk of the 
sacrifices that go along with public service in the context of Hero leadership.  Trinka 
believes the paucity of Hero leaders and the unrealistic expectation of internal and 
external stakeholders that all leaders be heroic, sets organizations up for revolving door 
leadership as heroic leaders simply cannot meet the expectations we place on them. 
Bellavita believes we can learn valuable lessons by studying the hero’s journey and find 
behaviors worth emulating and perhaps even institutionalizing.  While their views may 
appear at first glance to be diametrically opposed, upon reflection, they may both be 
correct.  But before we can discuss what traits or principles should be exhibited by an 
FBI Senior Executive, it might be valuable to continue to look at the distribution of 
leaders currently residing in the FBI leadership system. 
 
                                                 
38 Jim Trinka, interview by author conducted via telephone and e-mail, Washington, D.C., February 8, 
2007. 
39 Christopher Bellavita, “The Public Administrator As Hero,” Administration and Society, vol. 23 no. 
2 (August 1991): 155-183. 
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Interestingly, the Senior Executive Service Unit (SESU) of the FBI’s Human 
Resources Division recently conducted exit interviews of fifty FBI Senior Executive 
Service (SES) employees who left the FBI between 2003 and 2006.  Several common or 
recurring themes appeared as factors influencing the decisions of the senior executives to 
leave the FBI.  Around 31% of the respondents indicated they left due to recruitment by 
the private sector and the opportunity to make more money or other financial incentives.  
The overwhelming majority or 69% of the executives provided quality of life and/or 
career satisfaction related reasons for departing.  The recurring themes included family 
issues (27%), organizational change (15%), diminished sense of value to the FBI (13%), 
stress or burn-out (10%), and being unable to make a difference or contribute further, due 
to circumstances beyond their control (4%).40  Perhaps the FBI needs more “Hero-
Leaders” at the SES level as described by Trinka and Bellavita. 
Mike Ferrence, a retired FBI Supervisory Special Agent and Unit Chief of the 
Leadership Development Unit offered the following observations, 
While I firmly believe change is critical, I would want to know what gets 
in our way of producing the outstanding leaders we’re capable of.  What is 
being rewarded, what is being punished or not punished, what is being 
modeled by those currently in leadership positions that people want to 
replicate or want to avoid, in what ways the issues of litigation (or the fear 
of litigation) are preventing us from making decisions that will take us to 
the top of our game.   
I firmly believe, as I’ve said before, it is not a lack of knowing what to do; 
it is the resolve to commit to having leaders that allow the organization to 
reach its potential.  I also believe, and I have a bias, that the mindset of so 
many lawyers in senior positions, Director, Deputy Director, etc. as well 
as an army of lawyers in our Office of General Counsel has created a 
transactional mentality.  Lawyers move ahead by staring in the rear view 
mirror.  They see things rather than visions.41 
Table 6, below, looks at the dispersion of FBI leadership positions at FBI 
Headquarters and in the field over the past ten years. 
                                                 
40 Dave Bennett, interview by the author via telephone and e-mail, Washington, D.C., February 20, 
2007. 
41 Michael Ferrence, interview by author via telephone and e-mail, Morganton, North Carolina, 
February 7, 2007. 
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Table 6. FBI Special Agent Leadership Staffing Comparison  
 
A review of Table 5 shows some interesting trends over the past decade.  The 
total number of leadership positions in the Special Agent ranks has increased by 62 %, as 
compared with a 15 % increase in total agent personnel.  The largest increase has been at 
the GS-15 level at 118%, with an increase in 59% at the GS-14 level. Interestingly, the 
number of SES positions for Special Agents decreased by 14%. 
The significant increase in supervisory personnel is likely explained by Director 
Mueller’s vision of centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations in the 
post 9/11 FBI.  It can also be explained by the creation of numerous new Headquarters 
units to combat terrorism and facilitate the FBI’s transition to an intelligence-driven 
organization.  Finally, the bifurcation of national security and criminal responsibilities in 
field divisions has seen the creation of several new Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge 
(ASAC) positions, leading to the creation of 56 new ASAC positions in the field since 
2001. 
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So what does this mean?  It means there is a much larger pool of candidates 
eligible to compete for the SES ranks of the FBI.  It also means many of the individuals 
in ASAC positions will be unable to move up and as they remain in their positions 
longer, it will be difficult for rising GS-14 supervisors to compete for ASAC positions. 
This compression of leadership at the GS-15 level potentially develops a rich pool of 
candidates for temporary duty assignments to FBIHQ and to support counterterrorism 
and other priority program initiatives in the U.S. and abroad.  It develops a large pool of 
qualified individuals to hold GS-15 jobs at FBIHQ.  Once this pool of leaders is 
stabilized, there should be no reason to promote a GS-14 to the GS-15 level without 
having successfully completed a field supervisory assignment. FBI Special Agent 
supervisors who are unable to compete for positions at the next higher grade should be 
provided additional developmental opportunities at their existing grade.  Finally, a robust 
cadre of GS-15 personnel should provide opportunities for the “best and the brightest” to 
be afforded outside educational opportunities to further develop them for the SES level. 
With most offices having at least two ASAC positions, there seems to be little reason for 
the top ten percent of the ASAC cadre to be prohibited from attending external executive 
development programs in preparation for the SES ranks.  This will be important to 
improve the quality of the SES candidate pool as increasing the size of the pool does not 
necessarily mean the number of quality SES candidates is increases nor does it mean the 
candidates have been armed with the requisite skills to be successful at the SES level. 
Review of Table 6 also shows the total percentage of supervisors assigned to 
FBIHQ to be around 42%.  The smallest percentage of leaders assigned to FBIHQ is at 
the GS-14 level with 37% of the positions located at headquarters.  The largest 
percentage of leadership positions at FBIHQ is at the GS-15 level with 58% and 53% of 
the SES cadre calls the Washington metropolitan area home.  While the smallest 
percentage of leaders at FBIHQ belongs to the GS-14 level, it represents the largest 
number of individuals. This may explain why so much effort and expense has been 




duty program and five year “up or out” plan were designed to help fill vacancies in 
supervisory jobs at FBIHQ. Tom Shoop in an article he titled. “Promotion or Pink Slip” 
for Government Executive magazine writes,  
In May, the Los Angeles Times reported on the FBI’s attempt to force field 
office agents to accept positions at Washington headquarters.  About one 
fifth of the 1,500 top FBI jobs in Washington are vacant, the paper 
reported-partly because of the positions Director Mueller has created in 
recent years to beef up the agency’s counterterrorist capability.  So the 
FBI is requiring field agents with five years managerial experience to 
apply for supervisory jobs in Washington.  Those who refuse are dropped 
out of the managerial ranks and handed a pay cut… 
…The FBI’s action comes at a time when many corporations, concerned 
about the ongoing threat of terrorism, are in the market for high-level 
security officers. FBI agents-especially those with management 
experience-are prime candidates for such jobs.42 
Former FBI Senior Executive Kevin Kendrick served at the SES level as the 
Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) of the Administrative Services Division (ASD) and as 
a Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of one of the FBI’s 56 field divisions.  As such, 
Kendrick has seen the issues associated with FBI policies for getting qualified leaders 
into the system and the results or unintended consequences these practices have had on 
field operations.  Concerning the five year “up or out” policy and the eighteen month 
temporary duty plan, Kendrick offered the following observations, 
Although I believe progress has been made in addressing some systemic 
problems in terms of the voluntariness of our system, I do not believe the 
current manner in which careers are managed will serve the best interests 
of the FBI in the long-term.  Our current management of the career 
development system seems to be reactive and not one in which individuals 
are given the skills or more importantly, the time, they need to develop 
leadership qualities which will hopefully serve them and their co-workers 
in the future.  I base this qualified response on the following: the five-year 
“up or out” plan was necessary in order to ensure continued development 
of our future leaders in positions of higher responsibility.  It sent the 
message that no longer would supervisors be allowed to sit in a particular 
office and aspire to nothing further as it relates to increased management 
responsibility.  One might even argue that because there were no 
“continuing education” requirements for sitting supervisors, their ability to 
                                                 
42 Tom Shoop, “Promotion or Pink Slip,” Government Executive (June 15, 2006): 66. 
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perform their jobs in a manner consistent with prevailing law and Bureau 
rules might be impaired due to a lack of currency relative to skills 
acquisition.  It is in this vein that I believe certain aspects of the system 
were at least, well-intentioned if not in fact, beneficial to the organization. 
On the other hand, career development was severely hampered when the 
Bureau instituted the “18-month” plan wherein individuals from field 
offices were eligible to receive supervisory credit for serving 18 months at 
HQ in a temporary duty capacity.  This reaction to a shortage of applicants 
for HQ positions effectively created a caste system at HQ and bred much 
resentment (and rightfully so) on the part of those individuals who sought 
management responsibilities in the traditional fashion.43 
Dr Trinka believes the true impediment toward establishing leadership succession 
up to the SES level in the FBI lays in the inability of the organization to define what it 
wants its leaders to look and act like. Trinka advised, 
No one has specified the "desired" leadership style for FBI leaders in 
terms of behavior and competencies.  The 8 current competencies are so 
general as to be inconsequential (e.g., leadership is one...what isn't in that 
category?).  Because of the lack of specificity in this regard, an unofficial 
"accepted" style of leadership has emerged and it is what I call "hero 
leadership.”  In this model, the leader has to have the capacity to know 
everything about each situation, make all the decisions about plans and 
operations, be responsible for everything, be a great communicator, have a 
command presence, and generally rush into every situation and "rescue" 
the organization.  That unofficial model is expected by both senior 
leadership and employees, encouraged, rewarded, promoted, and in fact 
demanded by all stakeholders.  The truth is that few leaders can meet these 
expectations and there aren't enough of these types to fill all leadership 
posts.  Because the apparent standards are so high, a decreasing number of 
agents aspire to leadership ranks and prefer to perform investigative duties 
that they love.  Until this changes, nothing will change.44 
The FBI needs to develop a leadership culture and institutionalize leadership in a 
way that its best and brightest will unhesitatingly answer the call. Developing “Hero-
Leaders” may represent a bridge too far as such leaders emerge infrequently and typically 
represent a small percentage of any organization’s leadership.  Institutionalizing heroic 
behavior on the part of all leaders may represent an unattainable goal.  However, 
developing a culture of leadership in the FBI’s Special Agent ranks would undoubtedly 
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represent a move in the right direction for the agency.  Once a leadership culture 
emerges, the organization will have an obligation to prepare them for the rigors of 
leadership tailored for each successive level.  Leaders will need to learn how to lead 
themselves, how to lead others and ultimately how to lead the organization.  The next 
section will attempt to articulate the strategic vision for FBI leadership and define a 
specific strategic goal that if realized will represent the “just one thing” necessary to drive 
the FBI toward attainment of its strategic vision. 
 
D. JUST ONE THING: DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGIC VISION AND 
STRATEGIC CHANGE GOAL 
Shortly after 9/11, a management study of the FBI commissioned by the 
Department of Justice and conducted by Arthur Anderson Consulting, LLP was released. 
The executive summary prophetically described the new normalcy of the post 9/11 
Bureau: 
Today, the FBI faces its most serious crisis in history, yet the Bureau is 
faced with another important challenge; to support its agents with 
everything they need to perform their jobs.  As serious as the current crisis 
is, it will not be the only crisis the organization will face in the coming 
years.  The lack of an effective organization structure, inadequate 
information technology, poor personnel practices and crisis management 
deficiencies are no longer just good government issues.  They have a real 
impact on the operations of the Bureau.  Especially in the wake of 
September 11, 2001, the Bureau does not have the luxury of ‘business as 
usual’. 
The report goes on to say some of the recommendations will require significant 
financial and human resources and will require top-level commitment and support to 
resolve.  It identifies several Bureau-wide issues including the need to ensure 
accountability, the need to capture best practices and a greater focus on management 
issues and on strategic thinking.  While the report recognizes the complexity and 
diversity of the FBI’s mission, it opined a lack of commitment by the FBI to make 
changes would see the organization not only fall short of being the world’s pre -eminent 
law enforcement agency, but would prevent it from becoming a well-managed world 
class organization with recognized best practices. 
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Finally, the report identified a single compensating strength that offset the FBI’s 
weaknesses in a time of crisis.  The report identifies the employees’ dedication to the 
mission and the agent’s esprit de corps as the backbone of the organization.  The report 
conceded without the remarkable ethos of the FBI agent, the ineffective organizational 
structure would likely lead to even more serious consequences.45 
Ed Stephenson of the National Academy of Public Administration has looked at 
the FBI’s human resources practices and is of the opinion, 
The Bureau has an incredible set of potential leaders that could fill all the 
needed requirements.   However, the Bureau does not have a process to 
identify, develop, and select the right leader for the right position.46 
FBI whistleblower Mike German was more pointed in his assessment of the FBI’s 
leadership ranks.  When asked if the current system of individual career management was 
adequate to staff the FBI’s leadership needs, German stated: 
No.  The only leaders I ever saw in the FBI were the experienced GS-13s 
out in the field.  They were the ones who knew what needed to be done to 
work the cases, big and small, that make the FBI the successful 
organization it is.  They were who the GS-14s, GS-15s and SACs relied on 
to get everything done.  That the GS-13s had to accomplish this in spite of 
an obstructionist bureaucracy, particularly at headquarters where 
supervisors with the least knowledge of the situation often impeded or 
delayed investigations, further demonstrates the talents these agents bring 
to the FBI.  But there was no incentive for these agents to go into 
management, and in fact great disincentives- multiple moves, no 
autonomy, dull work, no actual authority.  In my experience the 
individuals who went into management were often agents who were less 
than successful on the street, bored or unhappy with agent work, and 
looking for an opportunity to move to another part of the country (rather 
than to innovate or to further develop bureau programs).  The management 
system as it existed when I left the FBI prized unquestioning compliance 
with the directives of their superiors above all else, regardless if doing 
what their superiors said was appropriate or not.  This meant the worst 
possible leadership traits survived as individuals moved up the ladder.47 
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Mike Ferrence is a retired FBI supervisor and the former Unit Chief of the FBI’s 
Leadership Development Unit.  His background and experiences make him an FBI 
insider that is uniquely qualified to comment on the state of the Bureau’s leadership. 
When asked if the FBI is well-led, Ferrence very candidly observed, 
As in all organizations the FBI has a range of leaders from outstanding to 
very poor.  The crisis it faces is in the inconsistency of leadership skills 
and abilities.  The range between the best and the worst has to be 
narrowed toward the top of the range.  We generally hire individuals who 
are successful in what they were doing prior to employment with the FBI. 
Some were excellent in their technical fields or outstanding in their 
professions, neither of which necessarily equates to excellence in 
leadership.  We sometimes confuse technical proficiency, well developed 
communications and interpersonal skills as leaders. 
What I believe we should consider is an analysis of current and former 
leaders based on success criteria that was identified by General Colin 
Powell when he defined leadership during a presentation at the FBI 
Academy several years ago.  He said, ‘Leadership is having people follow 
you around a corner just to see where you are going next.’  Leadership 
does not exist without follower.  There has to be trust, confidence in your 
ability, and a track record of success. 
Often we look for someone else, or another profession (Military, 
Politicians, Private Sector Executives, Academia, etc.) to define what 
leadership is, and hence what we should be.  While they all have great 
models and examples of what leadership is, I believe leadership is defined 
in a context.  We are not military generals fighting a war, Congressmen 
and Senators serving our constituents, Fortune 100 CEOs building an 
economic empire, Scholarly Professors lighting the way for the next 
generation, we are all of them at one time.  As we continue to find the 
great solution, we fail to understand the making of a great leader in the 
FBI as a patch work of skills, talents, intuition, emotional intelligence, and 
much more.  Further, it is a continuous process, a journey to excellence 
rather than a finite state. 
As in all organization, we tend to regress to the mean.  Our great leaders 
are held back by the mistakes of poor leadership, by external forces that 
constantly look for ‘who screwed up’, rather than trying to understand the 
system forces that created the problem in the first place.48 
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If the FBI redefined the mean through a structured and professional leadership 
development program tied to meaningful work experiences and evaluated in a fair, 
consistent and unbiased manner designed to provide feedback and encourage 
improvement, the FBI could redefine its mean as a culture of leadership excellence. 
Another alumni of the FBI Leadership Development Unit is recently retired 
Supervisory Special Agent Roger Trott who currently serves as the Executive Director of 
the FBI National Academy Associates.  Trott championed the cause of adopting the 
professional military education model as a method to professionally develop FBI 
Supervisory Special Agents and several of the initiatives occurring in recent times have 
happened as a result of Trot’s foresight.  When asked if the FBI is an organization that is 
well-led, Trott had the following to say, 
The FBI has some extremely capable leaders; however, it does not have 
the wide-spread and consistent level of outstanding leadership necessary 
to meet the post 9/11 complex demands on the organization.  These 
demands require that the FBI simultaneously restructure internally, 
acquire the operational capability of an intelligence service, maintain its 
traditional law enforcement mission, combine the new and old missions to 
thwart terrorism, and rapidly strengthen its cyber and technological 
wherewithal.   
The FBI hires highly qualified individuals into the agent work force. 
These individuals, for the most part, either already possess honed 
leadership skills or are capable of acquiring them rapidly.  The FBI’s 
agent selection process, the extremely large number of highly qualified 
applicants, and the relatively small number of agents hired has 
traditionally resulted in a very competitive and highly selective hiring 
process.  This has resulted in the average hiring age of new agents to 
remain between 29-31 years of age for the past thirty years, (although they 
are eligible to hire at 23) and has led to very experienced, well educated, 
and highly motivated individuals entering the agent work force. 
Unfortunately, after hiring these individuals their professional 
development is, for the vast majority, determined almost exclusively by 
their on-the-job experiences and personal initiative.  Similarly, those 
agents entering the career development program to take on additional 
leadership and management responsibilities, along with the more complex 
operational and strategic organizational problems, will historically get 




increase their professional job knowledge.  Again their professional 
development will be based upon their on-job-experiences and an 
occasional leadership seminar.49 
Interesting that the comments of former FBI supervisors suggest the FBI does not 
have enough qualified leaders and argues for bringing up the mean through a systematic 
approach as an alternative to the FBI’s current leadership woes.  If the FBI is an 
organization full of leaders, why is it apparently so poorly led?  What are the dynamics 
that prevent it from going from good to great?  The FBI must learn to effectively harness 
the incredible talent residing in its Special Agent workforce in order to create a culture of 
high performing leaders. 
Clearly there are some outstanding leaders emerging in the FBI.  It is just as clear 
that this is not occurring as a result of any effort on the part of the FBI, but rather in spite 
of it. Outstanding leaders develop through their own initiative in today’s FBI.  They are 
constantly being challenged to “save” the organization and have successfully 
compensated for the organization’s demonstrated shortcomings.  So what if the FBI made 
a commitment to bring up the mean?  The Bureau needs to concentrate its leadership 
development efforts not on the high performer or high potential leader, but on the lowest 
common denominator.  That simple step would relieve some of the pressure on today’s 
“Hero-Leaders.”  Such an investment in the FBI’s leadership would drive the FBI to 
achieving its optimal performance as an organization.  So how do we get started? 
The first step might be to envision an end-state.  What can be achieved by 
creating this culture of leadership excellence?  While it would be nice to set an 
overarching goal that is achievable, the real value of this exercise is to establish 
something to continue to strive toward, even if it is unattainable.  For the sake of 
argument and in order to further develop our thoughts, the strategic vision needs to be 
defined as something truly great and something easy to understand.  To drive our 
discussion, the strategic vision for the Bureau is:  “An FBI led by the world’s best law 
enforcement and national security leaders.” 
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Okay. So how does the FBI move closer to that end-state?  What is the “just one 
thing” preventing the FBI from perfection or at least becoming the pre-eminent law 
enforcement and national security agency that is emulated the world over?  What is the 
best first step toward a renewed “Brand FBI,” remade through a culture of excellence in 
leadership? 
FBI Executive Assistant Director (EAD) Don Packham, the FBI’s Chief Human 
Resources Officer, has tremendous experience in the transformation of human resources 
in a large organization, having served in a variety of human resource roles, most recently 
with British Petroleum where Mr. Packham was Senior Vice President of Human 
Resources for the Americas, overseeing human resources for over 50,000 employees.  
Mr. Packham graciously commented on the current system of individual career 
management at the FBI: 
Taking the definition of leadership in the FBI to mean SES level posts, the 
current approach of individual career management has limitations.  The 
process relies on individuals applying for leadership positions using a self-
assessment tool detailing their qualifications in the five core competencies 
of leadership and management.  A Board reviews the candidates and 
recommends appointments to the Director.  The strengths of this process 
include individual preference, competency based decisions, and sourcing 
that takes advantage of the depth and breadth of experiences from bureau 
and non bureau perspectives.  The limitations are bounded by a 
reactionary approach to a vacancy, lack of a total understanding of the 
bench strength and an insufficient opportunity to provide training and 
development for a specific post.  A more deliberate approach to 
development of leaders would more likely provide a richer pool of 
candidates.  The system today relies on volunteers in the main the future 
could better be served with a mix of volunteers and recruitment into the 
senior ranks. 
EAD Packham further commented on some of the impediments to change in the 
FBI Special Agent leadership system when he stated, 
The impediments to change are our past practice, concern over past 
lawsuits, assumption that past experience is a predictor of future success 
as a leader, and resistance to early identification of hi potential leadership 
talent.  Most significantly the leadership roles require more than just 
managing but rather it involves leadership through setting the vision or 
context, sharing and setting direction, outlining boundaries and holding 
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people accountable for their deliverables.  While early on in a career, an 
individual may display outstanding traits of leadership we may not 
acknowledge or have awareness of that potential.  To tell an employee 
they have EAD potential would be pre-selection and not allowed in the 
current system.  Early identification would enable a set of experiences and 
development options along a path to leadership. 
Leaders must also have some degree of subject matter knowledge. 
Selecting an agent with a CPA to be AD Finance on the basis that they 
have been an ASAC, SAC is probably lacking in the full breadth of 
experience required to be a leader who inspires vision and direction from a 
world of finance and accounting.  Sometimes we may be mixing a 
management role and a leadership role.50 
Roger Trott offered the following observations concerning impediments to change 
in the FBI’s leadership: 
Some would argue that the current amount of simultaneous organizational 
change at the headquarters level in the FBI has reached the point of chaos. 
The number and scope of personnel, operational, and administrative 
changes are often poorly coordinated, and in some cases the results of one 
new initiative are contrary or even counter to another.  In this environment 
of chaotic change it has become extremely difficult for executive 
leadership to identify and act on priority strategic initiatives such as 
comprehensively developing its leaders and successfully drive these high 
priority initiatives to fruition.  There are a number of significant obstacles 
to be overcome.  Career advancement in the FBI is tied very closely to the 
number and frequency of relocations that a leader and his family can bear. 
Below the SES pay grades there is also considerable pay compression 
which when combined with relocation and now a new, “up or out policy” 
provide ample reasons for many qualified leaders to step aside and not 
pursue long-term career advancement.51 
Retired FBI executive Kevin Kendrick observed, 
I do not believe our current system of career management is adequate to 
fill the leadership needs the Bureau currently has or will have in the future. 
Our leadership development is situational and is geared neither toward 
identifying potential leaders nor creating an atmosphere in which 
situational leadership attributes can be developed.  The basic problem is 
that we have had far too many changes in the career development system 
and far too many improvisations to “build” a system that will meet this  
 
                                                 
50 Donald Packham, interview by author vie e-mail, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2007. 
51 Trott, interview. 
 51
need.  We have far too many people being promoted after increasingly 
abbreviated tenures in supervisory/management roles and consequently, 
the opportunities to exhibit leadership are literally few and far between.52 
Kendrick further commented on the impediments or obstacles he believes are 
inhibiting the manner, FBI leadership practices are being emplaced or changed, 
There are numerous obstacles inhibiting the FBI’s ability to identify, 
select and develop candidates.  Among these are the desire to “be all 
things to all people” and instilling a false sense of urgency in everything 
we undertake.  Adding to this is the unceasing litany of oversight provided 
to the FBI, primarily through Congress, which necessitates adherence to 
artificial deadlines; taking away time which could be better utilized 
providing developmental opportunities for our prospective leaders.  Most 
significantly, however, the Bureau has historically subscribed to the notion 
that it had to be the architect of everything used by the Bureau (e.g., the 10 
MM pistol).  That same mentality was applied to our career development 
processes and consequently, methods tried and true in the private sector 
and other parts of government were eschewed for internal fixes.53 
Finally, Kendrick believes the current constant movement of SES level leaders is 
having a deleterious impact on the FBI, particularly in the field. Kendrick explained, 
The movement of managers in our SES ranks is having a tremendously 
negative impact on our relationships in the field.  I don’t believe HQ has 
examined this phenomenon adequately enough or seriously enough.  The 
attitude seems to be one of “the locals will get over it” as opposed to 
looking at the credibility gaps we’ve created.  I see this as a serious threat 
to the FBI’s long-term ability to accomplish our mission as (Police) Chiefs 
and others see that door continue to revolve.54 
Moving the FBI from a system of individual career management to a system of 
organizational or institutional professional development through a leadership pipeline 
model appears to be the most logical way for the Bureau to close the leadership gap 
between outstanding and very poor in its Special Agent leaders toward the higher end. 
Providing emerging leaders with structured opportunities spaced over a twenty to thirty 
year career in a predictive manner not only sets conditions for the success of the 
individual, but also provides the organization with a framework to develop effective 
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organizational leadership development and succession planning around.  As the National 
Academy of Public Administration report on Human Capital in the FBI recently pointed 
out, 
Successful transformation of the Bureau’s human capital management will 
require leadership that is characterized by continuity, experience, 
organizational knowledge, and technical competence, as well as the ability 
to inspire confidence and respect…Achieving some degree of stability in 
leadership is a key challenge for the Bureau.55 
To that end, the FBI needs to establish a strategic change goal of quickly moving 
the FBI from the current or “As Is” system of individual career management to a “To Be” 
system of organizational or institutional professional development manifested as a 
leadership pipeline.  This represents the “just one thing” that will likely produce 
immediate transformational results and work toward the establishment of a leadership 
culture within the FBI, a culture that has as its vision an FBI led by the world’s best law 
enforcement and national security leaders. 
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IV. EXPLORATION OF COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONS 
Don’t find fault, find a remedy. 
         -Henry Ford 
 
A. THE STRATEGY CANVAS: A COMPARISON OF LEADERSHIP 
SYSTEMS 
As of today, the FBI does not have an adequate or comprehensive leadership 
selection and development program or succession plan.  In fact, the National Academy of 
Public Administration recently completed a comprehensive review of the FBI’s human 
capital plan and found that a significant obstacle to the success of the FBI’s overall 
transformation efforts is its unwieldy human capital plan.56 
The American public would likely be shocked to know that the primary 
prerequisites for advancement are three years as an FBI Special Agent (two of which are 
spent as a Probationary special Agent or PSA), a “Meets Expectations” performance 
appraisal, and completion and verification of a job application.  They would further be 
surprised to find out that while management applicants are required to take a Leadership 
Skills Assessment test, until very recently they were not required to pass the test in order 
to advance.  Managers/leaders basically volunteer for the Executive Development and 
Selection Program (EDSP) and apply for specific jobs.  They are selected through review 
of an application they submit that is verified by individuals the applicant identifies.  
There is no interview or review of personnel records or performance appraisals as an 
indicator of future performance.  The application is reviewed and compared against other 
applications submitted for the same position by a career board convened by the hiring 
entity and validated by an FBIHQ career board, so it is not without some oversight.  As 
of 2003, applicants for Special Agent management positions were required to take the 
Leadership Skills Assessment (LSA), a test instituted as a result of a lawsuit.  However, 
applicants were not required to pass the LSA and test scores are not available for review 
by career boards.  Therefore, the only logical reason for taking the test was to meet the 
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requirements mandated by the Court as a result of the lawsuit.  Most major metropolitan 
police departments in the United States have developed a legally defensible “Sergeant’s 
Exam” to identify and screen applicants for management and leadership positions within 
their organizations.  Intelligence services have similar systems to identify and promote 
people.  This is a recognized industry standard to try and obtain the most qualified and 
best individuals to lead an organization.  Is there any reason America’s pre-eminent law 
enforcement agency shouldn’t be able to do the same?  The institution of the LSA has 
served as a good first step toward the development of a valid entry mechanism into the 
leadership ranks of the FBI, but it has not been without controversy.  The LSA and the 
career board process continue to have problems with transparency in the way they are 
utilized to identify and select leaders in today’s FBI. 
Psychological, personality, and leadership style testing should be part of the 
leadership selection process at all levels.  It helps identify individuals who may have 
flaws that could be problematic in a specific position or set of circumstances.  If former 
FBI employee and convicted spy Robert Hanssen had been psychologically tested, he 
may have been uncovered before he was in a position to do harm.  Certain personality 
types do not do well under pressure.  Is that the type of individual the FBI wants leading 
a contingent in Baghdad?  Furthermore, periodic retesting can serve as indicators of 
changed circumstances and might assist in prevention of stress related health issues or 
agent suicides.  The FBI mandates psychological testing for its undercover agents.  Why 
shouldn’t similar testing be mandated for its decision makers?  Such testing could also 
serve as a developmental tool providing valuable feedback for mangers/leaders to make 
adjustments and improve their effectiveness.  It might also mitigate some of the work-life 
issues or job dissatisfaction issues recently departed SES personnel identified as driving 
their decisions to depart the FBI. 
As recommended by the National Academy of Public Administration, the FBI 
should establish a leadership development program and succession plan. The FBI does 
not currently have a comprehensive succession planning or leadership development 
strategy for SES or for subordinate levels of Special Agent managers.  Positions are filled 
on a case-by-case basis and the successor usually arrives well after the incumbent leaves, 
 55
providing for no continuity of leadership.  There is no formal SES candidate development 
program and formal leadership development at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels remains 
scant. Turnover at the FBI’s SES level is excessive.57  
The FBI is well known for the leadership development opportunities it offers to 
its local, state, federal, tribal, and international law enforcement and intelligence service 
counterparts.  The Leadership Development Institute at the FBI Academy offers courses 
for law enforcement and intelligence executives from outside of the Bureau.  These 
courses include the prestigious eleven-week FBI National Academy (FBINA) that offers 
graduate and undergraduate level education courses for selected executives. 
Approximately 300 executives participate in this program four times annually.  The 
FBINA is so highly regarded that many U.S. police agencies require FBINA graduation 
as a pre-requisite for executive management or Chief of Police jobs.  Other executive 
management training courses offered by the FBI include the National Executive Institute 
(NEI), a program consisting of three one-week sessions for chief executive officers of the 
nation’s largest municipal, county, and state law enforcement organizations; the Law 
Enforcement Executive Development Seminar (LEEDS), a two-week seminar for chief 
executives of the nation’s mid-sized law enforcement agencies; Regional Command 
Colleges in twenty areas modeled after LEEDS; and the FBI Leadership Fellows 
Program, a year-long leadership development program with six months spent at Quantico 
and six months at the sponsoring agency.   
Conversely, the FBI Leadership Development Institute (LDI) offers only two 
required courses for FBI Special Agent leaders/managers.  These courses consist of the 
Supervisor Development Institute (SDI), a one-week seminar for new managers at the 
GS-14 level and a two-week Executive Development Institute (EDI) that is a pre-
requisite for selection as an ASAC.  What is preventing FBI Special Agent leaders from 
educational opportunities that are on par or exceed the opportunities the FBI provides for 
its local, state, federal, and international partners?  The FBI recently began affording 
opportunities for its executives to attend the training programs it offers to outside 
agencies, but the number of FBI employees able to take advantage of these programs 
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remains quite small.  There are other competitive educational opportunities such as 
attendance at military command and staff schools, law enforcement command colleges, 
attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School and the like available for FBI managers, but 
these opportunities for Special Agent supervisors are the exception rather than the rule. 
The FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009 establishes several strategic goals relating to an 
overall human capital strategy.  Among the three goals worth exploring are: 
• Establish a human capital capability that ensures the FBI maintains a 
preeminent workforce at all times.58 
This lofty goal may be the driver behind the temporary duty assignments 
instituted to lure individuals to FBIHQ as term GS-14 supervisors for eighteen months.  
A review of the plan determined financial incentives significantly contributed to 
increased Executive Development and Selection Program (EDSP) participation with a 
total of 581 selections occurring during all of fiscal year (FY) 2005 compared to 464 
selections during the first five months of FY 2006 after the plan was enacted and the 
financial incentives were approved.59  While this plan filled an identified void at FBIHQ 
in the workforce, it did not address the larger issue relating to providing FBI 
managers/leaders with challenging assignments to further their career development. 
Eighteen months may be long enough to effectively learn a job, but it is doubtful any 
meaningful long-term change can be effected in such a limited period of time.  A better 
fix would have been to make FBIHQ assignments more attractive by limiting them to 
three years and providing agents with a housing allowance to offset the prohibitive price 
of housing in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area.  The military successfully uses 
housing allowances to position their people in high-cost areas throughout the world 
without punitive effect.  The FBI could use the same model to make assignment to high-
cost areas more palatable. FBIHQ assignments need to be three years long to provide 
overall continuity to the implementation of the FBI’s strategic plan. 
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• Develop a system that dramatically expands the total training and career 
development of the FBI’s professional workforce.60 
The strategic plan identifies several actions to drive the realization of the above 
goal focused on expanding the Office of Training and Development, increasing training 
of new SA’s in the priority programs of counter-terrorism, counterintelligence and cyber, 
capitalizing on latest technologies as training mechanisms, transforming the FBI National 
Academy, improving technology, and expanding partnerships and relationships with 
premier academic institutions to develop executive training opportunities that expose 
current and future FBI leaders to the latest theories and practices in management, 
leadership, and professional development.  This is an excellent first step, but falls short 
unless the FBI develops a comprehensive internal management/leadership training 
program to develop its leaders at all levels and prepare them for successive levels of 
responsibility and command.  The FBI should not depend upon outside institutions to 
train, evaluate, and educate its leaders. Outside training opportunities should enhance or 
augment the skills the FBI provides. 
• Establish Career development and succession planning initiatives that 
identify future leaders, and that further forecast the matriculation of each 
new wave of senior FBI executives through important leadership positions 
within the organization to ensure continuity.61 
The priority actions indicated in the strategic plan include evaluating and 
acquiring software to track career progression of future senior executives, formalizing a 
mentoring program, develop instruments to gauge skills and interests, and develop an 
executive council to track the careers of future executives.  It falls short by not building 
in limits to address succession planning.  Leadership positions in the FBI should allow 
enough time for an individual to be evaluated, a minimum of three years for most 
assignments as this is the length the FBI uses in its inspection process.  Three annual 
performance appraisals and an inspection review would serve as an excellent indicator of 
future potential based upon past performance.  There should also be overlap between 
outgoing and incoming personnel in all leadership positions in order to provide continuity 
to the overall strategic plan.  Establishing term limits would provide predictability for the 
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individual as well as for the organization.  Forecast of future leaders should have as one 
of its components review or performance appraisals that are tied to rater profiles of how 
senior raters have rated all the employees under their command.  Having the next job 
simply isn’t good enough.  Measuring performance at each and every job is essential to 
separating average or marginal leaders from enlightened leaders. It also serves to provide 
valuable developmental feedback to leaders. 
Ed Stephenson, an employee of the National Academy of Public Administrators 
has looked closely at the FBI’s human capital functions and opined, 
The Bureau does not have a systematic way to identify, develop, and 
select its leaders.  Such a process, often called succession planning, is 
critical to an organization’s ability to maximize leadership and ensure 
continuity of operations.  Instead, the Bureau relies on self selection of 
individuals to bid on executive openings.  This results not only in a 
complicated, paper-intensive process, that often leaves critical positions 
with permanent leaders vacant, but also creates a high level of churn 
through positions.  As NAPA has pointed out the resulting short time 
agents fill positions makes leaders less effective and makes developing 
relationships with State and Local law enforcement officials difficult.  In 
addition, the continued use of agents in administrative management 
positions is questionable.  Most agent executives who fill positions in such 
areas as [Human Resource] or finance have little expertise in the area, 
generally don’t view the assignment as important to their career, and leave 
the position after serving only a year or two.  This results in positions 
being filled by officials who don’t know the subject and do not stay long 
enough to learn the basics, much less have the time to make needed 
changes to the administrative processes.62 
The FBI needs to start looking at its leadership in terms of an overarching system 
and move from the current system of individual career management to a system of 
institutional or organizationally driven professional development in the FBI’s Special 
Agent workforce.  This would represent the type of transformational change needed to 
secure the FBI’s future as America’s pre-imminent law enforcement and domestic 
intelligence agency.  A renaissance of leadership in the FBI’s Special Agent ranks is 
required if the organization is going to operate at its maximum potential. Leadership 
needs to become the essential system from which all other FBI systems, programs, and 
                                                 
62 Stephenson, interview. 
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activities flow.  The question to be explored next is how should the FBI identify, select, 
develop, evaluate and place exceptional leaders?  Those individuals in its Special Agent 
ranks with the greatest capacity to motivate and inspire, develop and mentor, articulate a 
vision and provide guidance and direction to achieve specific goals represent the future of 
the organization.  What must the FBI do to achieve the strategic vision of being led by the 
world’s best law enforcement and national security leaders? 
As previously observed, a report conducted by a panel of the National Academy 
of Public Administration in September 2005 concluded the Bureau does not have a 
comprehensive leadership development strategy for the Senior Executive Service or for 
subordinate levels of management.  The report further stated the FBI has recognized that 
succession planning must be driven by the needs of the organization and cannot rely on 
the voluntary career choices of individuals.  To that end, the panel recommended the FBI 
should create a comprehensive and managed plan for designing and implementing a 
complete system for succession planning and leader development.63 
Despite these recommendations, the FBI relies on a system where individuals 
continue to drive their own succession planning.  The implementation of initiatives such 
as the five year “up or out” policy or the eighteen month temporary duty program 
indicates the FBI continues to be wedded to previous practices and a system of 
volunteerism.  These incremental changes look a lot like prior policies implemented by 
the FBI. Perhaps a better solution to be explored would be to look beyond the current 
system of individual career management based upon volunteerism, individual desires and 
personal relationships.  The FBI should explore a more comprehensive solution that 
focuses more appropriately on the needs of the organization as its primary driving force. 
To that end, a comparison of the two systems of individual career management and 
organizational professional development is in order. 
Figure 3 below graphically depicts two alternatives for succession planning and 
leader development in the FBI64: 
                                                 
63 Thornburgh, et al., Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital Program, xv. 
64 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy  (Boston, MA: Harvard University 
Publishing Corporation, 2005), 32. 
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Figure 3. Strategy Canvas Comparing FBI Leadership Systems (From W. Chan Kim 
and Renee Mauborgne Blue Ocean Strategy, 2005) 
 
The strategy canvas as described by W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne in their 
book, Blue Ocean Strategy is an analytical framework that is both diagnostic and action 
oriented.  The authors argue the value of a strategy canvas is its ability to capture the 
current state as well as provide an understanding of various factors impacting on the 
current state and the suggested alternatives.65 
Figure 3 adapted from Blue Ocean Strategy, depicts the “As Is” or current system 
of individual career management, represented by the solid red line compared with the “To 
Be” or a proposed system of institutional or organizational professional career 
development represented by the broken green line.  The vertical axis of the strategy 
canvas assigns a value from low to high while the horizontal axis identifies specific items 
for comparison between the current and proposed FBI leadership systems. 
                                                 
65 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 25. 
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The current system requires a minimal investment by the FBI as it relies on 
volunteers and requires minimal resources to manage selection, professional 
development, and placement.  The proposed system will require additional investment by 
the FBI and may require significant increases in financial and human resources.  The 
current system relies primarily on a review of an individual’s verified application as the 
method for selection of a leader for the next level while the proposed system would 
require the submission of an application along with consideration of the individual’s 
performance appraisals, interviews and letters of recommendation, including 
recommendations made by individuals from outside of the FBI, and would be a more 
thorough evaluation of the candidate’s potential for advancement.  This represents the 
differences between an application based assessment and one that is evaluation based. 
While both systems focus on developing and building on the FBI’s eight core 
competencies for management, this may not be the best method for evaluating the 
potential of the FBI’s future leaders as the competencies are fairly vague and are not tied 
directly to the current system to evaluate performance.  The above chart illustrates how 
the two systems either are or could be tied to core competencies.  Both systems also 
encourage experienced based learning as most of the learning occurs through on-the-job 
training in the current system and the proposed system would seek to maximize learning 
by placing the candidates in jobs that build on existing training, skills, and education 
while matching individual backgrounds, skills and experiences to organizational needs. 
The proposed system, by its nature, encourages life-long learning across all levels of 
leadership. Finally, the proposed system provides the framework for succession planning, 
while the current system does very little to promote succession planning.  The strategy 
canvas serves as a starting point for comparing the two systems.  Further exploration and 
analysis of the current and proposed leadership systems are required for the FBI to fully 
understand the implications of changing its current practices. 
 
B. ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND 
THREATS OR CHALLENGES FOR FBI LEADERSHIP SYSTEMS 
The establishment of leadership as a strategic issue is merely the first step in 
instituting a strategic change. Before meaningful change can occur, it is necessary to 
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explore the internal and external environments in order to identify the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats or challenges the organization faces.66   Table 7 
compares the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats or challenges between the 
FBI’s existing “As Is” leadership system of individual career management with the “To 
Be” or proposed system of organizational professional development.67  The graphical 
analysis further links each of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats or 
challenges to the various business or leadership lines or components that make up the 
leadership systems.  The purpose of linking the analysis to the components of the two 
leadership systems is to further explore the value one system has over the other in making 
the argument for strategic change.  For the purpose of this analysis and subsequent 
analysis of the “As Is” and “To Be” FBI leadership systems, the critical lines of business 
or “leadership lines” include identification of high performing candidates for leadership 
positions, the selection of these individuals through a competitive process, the 
professional development of these individuals through training and education linked to 
job-related experiences, evaluation of high performing leaders at every level as a 
predictor of future potential and as a developmental tool, and placement of the most 
qualified individuals in a deliberate manner to maximize their contributions to the FBI. 
                                                 
66 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 150. 
67 Robert Bach, “ Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats or Challenges for 
FBI Leadership Systems,” (lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School on January 10, 2007). 
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Table 7. Analysis of Strengths Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats for FBI 
Leadership Systems (From lecture by Dr. Robert Bach, Naval 
Postgraduate School on January 10, 2007). 
 
The current system relies on volunteers to staff the leadership positions in the 
special agent ranks of the FBI.  Core leadership competencies are stressed and in order to 
successfully compete for supervisory positions, candidates must have also demonstrated 
proficiency in the core competencies for the non-managerial Special Agent job category. 
Selection is primarily based on an application submitted by the candidate and compared 
with other applicants for the same position.  Candidates who master the art of writing to 
specific “anchors” in the application process generally do better in the career boards. 
Selection is based more upon how well the application is written to the “anchors” than a 
comprehensive evaluation of the past performance or the actual or current qualifications 
of the candidate.  Once an individual is selected for a leadership position, professional 
development in the form of education and training remains the responsibility of the 
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individual.  There are some limited education and training opportunities available to FBI 
managers and supervisors and every Special Agent leader must attend the Supervisor’s 
Development Institute, a one week in-service at the GS-14 grade level and the Executive 
Development Institute (EDI) at the GS-15 level. Development is almost entirely by 
experience.  Good leaders emerge in this system and the system allows for individuals to 
plan their own futures, resulting in a self-sufficiency that may not be in the overall best 
interest of the organization. 
The proposed implementation of a leadership pipeline would encourage life-long 
learning through a combination of term limit assignments preceded by education and 
training linked to the next job so the two build on each other.  Promotion would be 
evaluation based and would include an application as well as letters of recommendation 
from non-bureau sources, review of performance appraisals as an indicator of future 
potential, and an interview process.  All leadership jobs would have a beginning date and 
an end date (that is extendable for up to two years in one year extensions with advanced 
notice), and there would be a career counseling or assignments unit whose primary 
function would be to match individual skills and developmental opportunities for 
personnel with the overall needs of the FBI.  Candidates would be given choices 
regarding the jobs they could apply for, but their choices would be limited so the needs of 
the organization drive choices above the desires of the individual.  This would facilitate 
better succession planning and would allow for overlap between incoming and outgoing 
leaders, something beneficial to the organization as it provides perspective and continuity 
to the organization’s operations.    
As people are typically resistant to change and the new system would be weighted 
towards the needs of the organization and as all of the existing leaders in the Special 
Agent ranks of the FBI have benefited from the existing system, there will likely be 
significant resistance to transformational change in favor of the current practice of 
making incremental or transactional changes.  Moreover, transforming the FBI’s 
leadership practices to the leadership pipeline model may require additional funding and 
other resources, creating additional resistance, both internally and externally.  Finally, 
once the new system is proposed and is in the process of implementation, it would need 
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to be evaluated.  How would you know if the system is moving you toward the strategic  
vision of an FBI led by the world’s best law enforcement and national security 
professionals?  Before attempting to answer that question, a discussion of the proposed 
FBI Leadership Pipeline is in order. 
 
C. A NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK:  THE LEADERSHIP PIPELINE 
Shortly after becoming the Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller was interviewed 
by author Ronald Kessler who was conducting research for his latest book titled, “The 
Bureau.”  During the course of the interview, Kessler asked the Director about leadership. 
According to Kessler, 
…Mueller got a gleam in his eye as he referred to his Marine Corps 
training.  ‘There are certain things you are taught in the Marine Corps that 
stay with you forever,’ he said as he sat at the head of his conference room 
table.  ‘You don’t ask people to do things you are not willing to do 
yourself.  You work harder than those you would lead.  You praise in 
public and criticize in private.  You delegate.’  The foundation of 
leadership is integrity, Mueller said.  ‘With that goes speaking your mind, 
not dissembling, being blunt.  It’s not easy to criticize people; it’s not easy 
to move people.  Those are all difficult things that are all part of 
leadership.68 
The United States Marine Corps; indeed the entire U.S. military serves as an 
excellent model of a leadership pipeline.  In fact, a symposium convened by the National 
Academy of Public Administration recommended transferring the military life-cycle 
career approach to civilian leadership development.  The panel found,  
The key reason the military does leadership development better is that the 
military is a career.  It develops leaders with each assignment-assignments 
are made for the purpose not of just doing that job, but of developing the 
individual for the next job.  Leaders are evaluated not just on how they are 
doing, but how they will do in the future.  The entire personnel system in  
the military is geared toward leadership.  However, it is far tougher to 
develop leaders on the civilian side where they are under the general 
schedule.69 
                                                 
68 Ronald Kessler, The Bureau (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 447. 
69 Bushnell, et al., Can Government Grow Great Leaders? 9. 
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The military is successful because it is a profession.  A profession as defined by 
the Merriam-Webster Dictionary is, “…a calling requiring specialized knowledge and 
often long academic preparation.”70  Samuel P. Huntington describes the military 
officership as a profession in his work The Soldier and the State by defining the 
distinguishing characteristics of the military officer profession in terms of expertise, 
responsibility, and corporateness.  Huntington argues the military officer possesses 
specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor that is obtained 
only through prolonged education and experience, is responsible, practicing expert that 
works and performs a service for the betterment of the society, and members of the 
military officer corps share a corporateness or group identity and sense of unity that is 
apart from laymen.71 
Couldn’t the same description be applied to the FBI Special Agent leadership 
corps?  FBI Special Agent leaders possess specialized skills and knowledge in a 
significant field of human endeavor (law enforcement or criminal justice and national 
security matters), have a responsibility that is socially motivated (justice and the 
protection of Americans world-wide), that is essential to the functioning of society, and 
maintain a group identity, a “Brand FBI,” that sets them apart from the rest of society.   
If you accept the premise serving as an FBI Special Agent marks you as a 
professional, what separates the professional leader from the mere participant?  Showing 
up and doing what is expected of you even if it requires hardships and personal sacrifice 
and expecting to be rewarded simply because you participated at various levels of 
leadership in the FBI marks you as a careerist.  A true professional is a life-long learner 
and an authority in his or her profession.  The professional constantly challenges himself 
and others.  The professional lets his actions define him.  Professionals care about the 
organization they are a part of and work to make it better.  Careerists learn to manipulate  
 
 
                                                 
70 Henry Bosley Woolf, et al., The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (New York: Pocket Books 1974), 
554. 
71 Samuel P. Huntington, “Officership as a Profession,” in A Study of Organizational Leadership 
(Harrisburg, PA: Stakpole Books, 1976), 524-525. 
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the organization, its people and its systems for their own benefit.  Careerists are inwardly 
focused, professionals look outward.  Careerists feel entitled, professionals feel fortunate 
to have the opportunity to serve. 
FBI whistleblower Mike German commented on the careerism of FBI leaders 
when he wrote, 
The biggest obstacle is that the individuals who would institute the change 
are the individuals who would be hurt by the changes.  Just before I left 
the FBI they changed the self-selection format to require listing the name 
of a supervisor who could verify the accomplishments claimed.  This 
seems to make sense, except of course that the accomplishment could 
already be checked against the records, but it demonstrates who is putting 
in for these jobs.  For an agent like me, with 15 years of experience, most 
of my supervisors had retired.  For an agent with a minimum of 
experience, however, the application was easy as he or she only had one or 
two supervisors at most, and probably was still working under the same 
supervisor.  That such a requirement would be placed shows that the 
supervisors creating the process have only their own frame of reference in 
mind, and are trying to promote people of like experience.  Another 
impediment is that the FBI disdains experts.  Since supervisors selected 
for a particular desk often don't have experience in working that violation, 
they can be easily embarrassed by their lack of knowledge.  Danny 
Couslon's book discusses this environment at HQ.  To avoid 
embarrassment these supervisors try to avoid bringing in-house experts 
who might challenge their authority into the room.  Despite two successful 
DT UC Operations, the DT unit refused to debrief me- not only didn't 
request a debriefing, but actually refused requests I made on several 
occasions over the years.  Finally the FBI disdains innovation. I told you 
about a white-collar crime squad supervisor I had in LA who complained 
to me that he was bored because the squad's work left little for him to do 
on a day to day basis.  In the same conversation he complained that two 
young agents on the squad were doing a poor job interviewing witnesses 
and writing 302s, but since the experienced agents were busy with their 
own cases he couldn't spare these agents to go with the young agents and 
train them. I suggested he could cure both of his problems by going 
himself with the young agents, but he looked at me like I was crazy and 
said the ASAC would never allow him to go out on interviews.  His 
absolute refusal to consider an obvious solution to his problems was 
indicative of the lack of initiative in management.  That he was probably 





This was not just one lazy supervisor, but a system that would have a 
supervisor sitting at his desk doing nothing rather than acting like a leader 
and going out to show the young agents how to do their jobs.72 
Is the FBI being led more by the careerist or the professional?  It seems the 
current leadership system based upon individual career management plays to the 
careerist.  If that is indeed the case, the FBI must tip the balance toward leadership by the 
professional.  The first thing that comes to mind to set conditions for the leader to 
become a professional is to institute a new framework to identify, select, professionally 
develop, evaluate and place its leaders.  But before we can construct the framework, 
perhaps we need to look beyond the core competencies and define what we want our 
leaders to look like.  We must define the guiding forces or principles we desire in all of 
our Special Agent leaders. 
The United States Army Leadership Field Manual describes the army leadership 
framework in terms of what a leader must “Be, Know, and Do.”  It clearly and concisely 
defines the characteristics of an Army leader.  “Be” defines the values and attributes of 
the leader.  “Know” defines the specific skills the leader will need to develop and “Do” is 
the leader’s action.  The Army defines leadership as “influencing people-by providing 
purpose, direction, and motivation-while operating to accomplish the mission and 
improving the organization.73 
What do FBI Special Agent leaders need to “Be, Know and Do”?  They certainly 
need to “Be” by understanding and adhering to the FBI’s core values defined as: 
• Rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the United States. 
• Respect for the dignity of all those we protect. 
• Compassion. 
• Fairness. 




                                                 
72 German, interview. 
73 The U.S. Army Leadership Field Manual FM 22-100 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 3-5. 
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• Accountability by accepting responsibility for our actions and decisions 
and the consequences of our actions and decisions; and 
• Leadership, both personal and professional.74 
FBI Special Agent leaders might “Be” as a result of individual attributes 
identified through the eight core competencies.  Special Agent leaders also need certain 
skills and abilities or “Know” how to deal with people, handle concepts, and be good 
technicians and problem solvers.  Finally, Special Agent leaders need to be decisive and 
act or “Do.”  But what will guide their actions?  It is one thing to have a set of values and 
yet another to adhere to a code of conduct or set of principles.  Principles act as a guiding 
force.  When principles are adopted in an organizational sense, they can have the effect of 
shaping the values of the organization. They can also provide a great deal of 
predictability toward how leaders will function as part of the organizational culture. 
Listen to the words of Director Mueller when he described the leadership lessons he 
learned as a young Marine.  To anyone who has worn a uniform in the armed services, 
his words ring true as the principles described by the Director have familiarity and likely 
continue to influence their own leadership styles.  The FBI would benefit from the 
establishment of formalized leadership principles for its Special Agent leaders. 
Established codes of conduct help drive how Special Agent leaders are expected to act. 
What might those overarching leadership principles look like? 
The U.S. Army has established a set of Principles of Leadership to help guide 
leaders under extreme and demanding conditions.  The U.S. Army Principles of 
Leadership are as follows: 
• Seek responsibility and take it for your actions. 
• Know yourself and seek self improvement 
• Make sound and timely decisions 
• Be technically and tactically proficient 
• Train your soldiers as a team 
• Set the example 
• Know your soldiers and look out for their well-being 
                                                 
74 “FBI Core Values,” http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm [Accessed February 8, 2007]. 
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• Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities 
• Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates 
• Keep your soldiers informed 
• Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished75 
These principles could almost be taken verbatim and adopted for use by the FBI. 
But for the sake of this and future discussions concerning leadership principles for FBI 
Special Agent leaders, the following principles, which are borrowed or adopted from the 
principles detailed above that are used by the Army, are proposed: 
• Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions. 
• Know yourself and seek self-improvement. 
• Be honest and never compromise your integrity. 
• Know your people and look out for their welfare. 
• Set the example by being technically proficient and never ask a 
subordinate to do something you are unable or unwilling to do yourself. 
• Keep your subordinates, peers and superiors informed, speak with 
frankness and candor. 
• Develop a sense of vision and focus on the bigger picture. 
• Learn to lead by being led. 
• Pay attention to the details by making sure every task is understood, 
supervised and accomplished. 
• Set conditions for success by knowing your limitations and the limitations 
of your team; employ them in accordance with their abilities. 
• Praise in public and constructively criticize in private. 
• Be decisive. 
Why does the FBI need a set of guiding leadership principles?  It needs them 
because the current leadership system of individual career management emphasizes the 
individual and not the organization.  Leadership principles refocus the energy of the 
individual in a way that is beneficial for the entire organization.  If the FBI hopes to 
become an organization led by a professional leadership corps, it needs to start by  
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emphasizing core values and establishing guiding principals.  Core competencies focus 
on the individual, core values define the organization and core principles support and 
help guide the individual to the greater benefit of the organization. 
Developing leaders isn’t easy.  It is a complex art made up of many different 
complex tasks. As FBI Executive Assistant Director Don Packham, head of the newly 
created Human Resources Branch observes, 
A dilemma is how you teach leadership development.  It is a combination 
of formal and informal training as well as professional development 
programs.  There are four types of leadership development options, 
assessment, coaching, learning, and experience based.  The outcomes of 
organization success are how it is measured.  In the case of the FBI have 
we been successful in our law enforcement and intelligence mission 
overall? In so doing are we adhering to our core values?  Are we leading 
in a way that takes full advantage of current state of practice and future 
thinking in technology and application of our human resources? 
The intervention is a complex web of a development strategy, a set of 
programs fitting within our culture, teachable moments, and connection to 
the context of our work.  The Bureau could raise the notion of leadership 
to a more visible conversation of what works, why we think it works, and 
how repeatable the events seem.  The solution to teaching leadership is not 
just one thing but a complex web of activities.  Useful models involve peer 
to peer challenge in the pursuit of excellence in outcomes.76 
Is it possible the task of developing leaders is made even more difficult by the 
unpredictability built into the current system of individual career management?  Could 
the FBI improve its ability to grow leaders with a different model built as a leadership 
pipeline? 
EAD Packham believes the FBI has a pipeline full of effective leaders, but 
concedes there are weaknesses, 
The FBI has effective leadership and has a pipeline of quality future 
leaders.  There is never a perfect fit for jobs and always there are tradeoffs. 
Our leaders possess, in the main, excellent tradecraft skills but fall short in 
the areas of business acumen, effective process management, project 
management, and strategic visioning.77 
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Given the areas or skills Packham believes the organization’s leader’s falls short 
in are executive level skills, how can the organization develop those skills in emerging 
executive leaders?  The FBI cannot be guided in transformational ways without strategic 
vision and strategic leadership skills in its executive ranks.  
Former Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan and his co-author Michael V. 
Harper describe Strategic Leadership in their book, “Hope is not a Method.”  Sullivan 
and Harper describe strategic leadership as the process of creating a future for an 
organization.  They write,  
It is a human process, involving first and foremost the leader and the 
people who make up the organization; working as a team…it is possible to 
transform any organization so that creative, adaptive behavior becomes 
imbedded in its culture, so that it can be successful in a future that cannot 
be predicted.  This process of creating the future is anchored in a strategic 
architecture for change based on values and vision, unified by strategy, 
directed by purposeful action, and continually evolving through a process 
of organizational learning.78 
The framework appearing below, or Leadership Pipeline Model for FBI Special 
Agent Leaders, serves as a proposed strategic architecture for the FBI business/leadership 
lines of identification, selection, development, evaluation and placement of Special Agent 
leaders.  This architecture encourages continuous learning, is anchored in the values of 
the organization and unlike the current system, elevates the needs of the organization 
above the desires of the individual. 
It serves as a suggestion for strategic change and hopefully a lightning rod for 
discussion about what FBI Special Agent leaders should look like and how they should 
be developed or grown. 
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Figure 4. FBI Special Agent Leadership Pipeline 
 
The idea of a leadership framework is nothing new to the FBI.  Various models 
and frameworks have been in use or are under development.  Most have education and 
training as a component and envision a formalized process.  The proposed framework or 
“Leadership Pipeline” depicted in Figure 4 is a variation of a number of good ideas that 
 74
have already been proposed or adopted.  The thing that sets this model apart is that it is 
an attempt at integrating all the leadership lines or functions necessary to develop a 
culture of leadership excellence.  It provides a mechanism to bring up the mean of our 
leaders and focuses heavily on the beginning of the pipeline with structured educational 
and developmental opportunities tied to meaningful work experiences. 
Entry into the leadership pipeline would begin at the FBI Academy during New 
Agent’s training where individual leadership skills, core values, core competencies, and 
core leadership principles will be emphasized.  The focus will be on leading yourself. 
This will be tied to the two year Probationary Special Agent program where the new 
agent is provided with valuable job experiences as he or she develops technical skills and 
competencies as an investigator. 
After completing the Probationary special Agent program, agents will spend an 
additional year learning their craft before being eligible to apply as a relief supervisory 
special agent.  Acceptance into the relief supervisory special agent program will trigger a 
series of distance learning and on the job training opportunities.  Agents will also be 
required to take the GS-14 Leadership Development Assessment between year three and 
six. Agents failing the GS-14 LSA will be given a developmental plan and will be 
required to re-test within two years.  Agents passing the GS-14 who have completed at 
least one year as a relief supervisor and have spent one year at the GS-13 grade level will 
be eligible to apply to attend the Supervisor’s Development Institute Leadership 
Academy (SDILA).  Selection will be competitive and slots will be based upon the 
current leadership needs of the FBI. Selection and successful completion of the SDILA 
will come with an incentive package such as a step increase and graduate level course 
credits.   
The Supervisor’s Development Institute Leadership Academy will enhance the 
knowledge, skills, and abilities of mid-level FBI supervisors and seek to provide a 
consistent baseline of knowledge across the organization.  It will provide a professional 
credential and serve as a right of passage into the leadership ranks just as New Agent’s 
training serves as a right of passage into the FBI. The focus will be on leading others, the 
consequence will be the creation of leadership as a profession. 
 75
The leadership academy would be based along the lines of the FBI National 
Academy in that it would provide an opportunity for supervisors to earn graduate level 
credit.  This encourages a culture of learning and could easily be wedded to a distance 
learning program that would result in a master’s degree for all participants.  The academy 
would consist of a proposed twelve week program inspired in part by the FBI National 
Academy and in part by the British National Police Strategic Command Course.  Students 
would be required to complete various course modules and would be tested or required to 
complete papers for grades and graduate level credits.  Modules for the Supervisor’s 
Development Leadership Academy might include: 
Module 1:  Leadership 
Module 2:  Partnerships-Joint operations, task forces, public-private 
partnerships and the media. 
Module 3:  Managing Counterterrorism Investigations 
Module 4:  Managing Counterintelligence Investigations 
Module 5:  Managing Criminal Investigations and the Use of sophisticated 
investigative techniques 
Module 6:  Technology for the FBI manger and managing Cyber Crime 
investigations. 
The Supervisor’s Development Institute Leadership Institute would also include 
the first 360 degree review of the individual leader as a developmental tool. Selection as a 
Supervisor will be competitive and based upon the needs of the organization.  There may 
be classes where there are not enough supervisory positions to fill and students will return 
to their field offices until a supervisory position opens. 
Upon completion of the SDILA, graduates will be placed in supervisory jobs 
based upon the needs of the FBI and matched with the skills and if possible preferences 
of the individual. An alternative method to consider for assignment of newly minted 
supervisors might be to tie the class rank of the student to the selection of his or her 
assignment.  Each student could be ranked and would select their assignment based upon 
their class rank. There would be one academy class per quarter adding predictability to 
transfers and building in a mechanism for the organization to conduct forecasting of  
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future needs and an overlap of incoming and outgoing leaders in order to enhance 
continuity of operations.  This dynamic will be repeated at all FBI special Agent 
leadership levels. 
All supervisory jobs at the GS-14 and GS-15 levels would have term limits of 
three years that are extendable to five years.  Three years is long enough to learn a job 
and make a difference.  It is also long enough for the supervisor to be effectively 
evaluated and held accountable for his or her performance.  Supervisors with technical 
skills such as bomb techs, laboratory scientists, instructors, etc. or individuals desiring to 
stay in-place due to personal situations, such as the care of elderly parents, health related 
issues, balancing of the career of a spouse, or other personal needs will be allowed to re-
compete for their jobs at the five year mark.  This provides flexibility for those 
individuals to continue to benefit the organization by remaining in their current positions. 
It also provides senior leaders with the ability to make changes if such changes are in the 
best interest of the organization.   
Upon completing assignments at FBIHQ and in the field at the GS-14 level, 
leaders will be able to compete for jobs at the GS-15 level, but only after successfully 
completing the GS-15 LSA.  Once the candidate passes the LSA, he or she will be 
programmed for the Executive Development Institute (EDI).  EDI will be expanded from 
its current form and will focus on organizational level skills such as strategic planning 
and program/project management.  It will also include instruction on crisis management 
and strategic communication.  EDI will be conducted for all FBI Special agent and non-
agent leaders in a joint environment.  The course will include a group project and policy 
recommendation presentation relating to a strategic issue of importance to the FBI. 
Participation in EDI will also require or trigger a 360 degree review as an individual 
developmental tool.  The focus will be on leading organizations as opposed to leading 
people. 
Other professional development opportunities such as the University Education 
Program, Sabbatical Program and attendance at the FBI National Academy, National 
Executive Institute, LEEDS, and other courses will be recommended and placement in 
these continuing education opportunities will be competitive.  
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The difference between this model and the steps being enacted in the FBI today is 
the focus will not be on the high potential or high performers, but rather on bringing up 
the mean by investing heavily in the improvement of leadership and technical skills for 
the entry level manager/supervisor and following up at the higher level with improving 
organizational skills.  Currently the FBI is spending around 17 million dollars on external 
programs serving a small percentage of high performing or high potential leaders, mostly 
at the GS-15 level and above.  Conversely it is spending approximately 1.7 million 
dollars on internal leadership development programs.79  The total budget for the FBI is 
currently around 5.7 billion dollars.  The FBI is apparently not spending very much of its 
total budget on the development of its leaders and the dollars it is investing are focused 
on the wrong end of the leadership continuum.  It makes more sense for the organization 
to increase its spending on all of its leadership development programs with the majority 
of the money going toward programs designed for the junior leaders as the organization 
will benefit from these educational and developmental experiences for a longer period of 
time.  Additionally, an investment focused in this manner will likely have the impact of 
bringing up the mean.  A better quality of leader will help limit the reliance of the 
organization on the “Hero Leader” to save the organization as an over-arching culture of 
leadership across all ranks and levels of leadership emerges. 
Under the proposed system, selections will be based on a full evaluation of each 
candidate and placement will be driven by the needs of the Bureau.  In order to 
effectively forecast and staff leadership needs by placing the right individuals with the 
right skills at the right place and time; a new unit will be created in the Human Resources 
Branch.  This unit, known as the Career Counseling and Placement Unit will make use of 
technology to track the development of leaders, help shape choices for and mentor 
individual leaders and ensure leadership development is done in a focused manner 
designed to fill the overall leadership needs of the FBI.  
Another organizational change for consideration is the creation of a Knowledge 
and Futures Unit to manage professional development of Special Agent leaders and to 
conduct research into re-occurring and emerging issues of concern to the organization. 
                                                 
79 Charles “Skip” Robb, interview by author via telephone, Quantico, Virginia, February 12, 2007.  
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This would allow the FBI to be more proactive, to harness lessons learned in a 
meaningful way that can be accessed by the entire organization and to systematically 
seek solutions to organizational problems.  One of the responsibilities of the Knowledge 
and Futures Unit might be to identify issues to be worked on as group and individual 
projects by attendees at EDI.  Imagine an FBI where rising executives are not only able to 
identify strategic issues, but have a mechanism to conduct meaningful research into 
finding solutions that can be captured and perhaps utilized by the FBI.  If the Bureau 
funded four EDI courses per fiscal year and each class worked on solving two to three 
strategic issues, the payback potential for the organization is exponentially great, 
especially when compared to the mechanisms that exist today. 
Moreover, the proposed leadership pipeline can be fully implemented with 
incremental or transactional changes that taken together will create a truly 
transformational solution to the FBI’s inadequate leadership development capabilities. 
  
D. INPUTS, OUTPUTS, AND OUTCOMES: A DISCUSSION OF 
DEVELOPING THE LEADERSHIP PIPELINE 
Figure 5 below, describes the inputs, outputs and outcomes for the proposed 
system or “FBI Leadership Pipeline.”80  
Moving from the current system of individual career management to a system of 
organizational professional development will require an increased investment by the FBI 
in terms of funding and human resources.  This investment could be significant; however, 
as depicted in Figure 5, the outcomes or the return on the FBI’s investment could far 
outweigh any costs.  Developing a leadership pipeline for FBI Special Agent leaders 
would greatly improve the FBI by improving the technical competencies of its leaders 
through a combination of integrated training, education, and on the job experience.  It 
would also provide a mechanism to better match skills and abilities with specific jobs to  
 
 
                                                 
80 Harry P. Hatry, Performance Management: Getting Results  (Washington D.C.: Urban Institute 
Press, 1999), 33.  
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improve the capacity of the organization to meet new and emerging threats.  Finally, such 
a system by its nature emphasizes common core competencies as the FBI seeks to find, 
develop and place the right person with the right skills in the right place at the right time. 
 
 
Figure 5. Developing an FBI Leadership Pipeline (From Harry P. Hatry, Performance 
Management: Getting Results, 1999) 
 
A greater degree of institutional commitment will undoubtedly improve the 
leadership abilities of the FBI’s mid-level and executive supervisors, managers, and 
leaders and in doing so will encourage new behaviors, emphasize organizational values, 
and help to positively change the FBI’s culture. A transformation of the FBI’s leadership 
systems would help break the cycle of successive transactions conducted to offset the 
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weaknesses inherent to an individually driven career management system.  A 
transformational approach, looking at the issue as an entire system would provide more 
predictability, transparency, accountability, and a larger degree of responsibility by both 
the individuals seeking advancement and the organization they serve.  Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the increased professional development opportunities 
mandated under the proposed system and the ability of the organization to more 
effectively place its leaders will undoubtedly bring up the mean level of the Special 
Agent leader, moving the organization closer to a culture of leadership excellence. 
Ultimately, the development of a “Leadership Pipeline” for FBI Special Agents moves 
the Bureau closer to the strategic vision of being led by the world’s best law enforcement 
and national security leaders. 
 
E. BENCHMARKING THE STRATEGIC ACTION REQUIRED TO 
DEVELOP AN FBI SPECIAL AGENT LEADERSHIP PIPELINE 
For the leadership lines to have meaning, they must be intertwined and 
interrelated, forming the framework for a comprehensive leadership system.  Designing 
an overarching leadership system for Special Agent leaders’ represents a lofty strategic 
goal.  Development of exemplary law enforcement and intelligence community leaders in 
the midst of the FBI’s ongoing transformation will require a comprehensive plan and a 
commitment from the highest levels of the Bureau. 
Once the FBI moves toward a system of organizational leadership development or 
the “To Be” vision of a leadership pipeline, it will be important to continue to manage the 
strategic shift and to measure the effectiveness of the individual strategic actions taken to 
institute the change.  To do this, the FBI will need to establish specific benchmarks to 
measure progress being made in the identified leadership lines used to identify, select, 
develop, evaluate, and place Special Agent leaders. The benchmarks or indicators 




should be maintained, reformed, or eliminated.81   Figure 6 serves as an example of a 
strategic framework for the proposed leadership pipeline.  It identifies specific strategic 
goals and objectives along the business lines defining the new leadership system. 
                                                 
81 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 292. 
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Figure 6. Benchmarking the Strategic Action Required to Develop an FBI Special 
Agent Leadership Pipeline (From Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and 
Non-Profit Organizations, 2004) 
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Figure 6 depicts specific goals relating to the five business or leadership lines. 
These goals are designed to improve each business/leadership line by conceptualizing 
desired outcomes.  For example, the goal for the Identify business line is to identify high 
performers and high potential leaders.  To do this the objectives or measurable outcomes 
include instituting a policy where all Special Agents take the Leadership Skills 
Assessment Test between their third and fifth year in the FBI. This is akin to registering 
for the draft as it would provide the organization with a ready pool of qualified 
applicants.  It allows leaders to conduct developmental training for those not passing the 
test while identifying the individuals who have demonstrated leadership potential through 
a validated mechanism.  As all agents would be required to take the test, the organization 
would also have the best possible population to measure the test by and continue to make 
changes as indicated by the anticipated leadership needs of the organization.  This in turn 
provides the starting point for objective number two under the Identify goal.  Objective 
number two is to have at least two viable candidates for every entry level supervisory job. 
This could be accomplished through a system of formalized mentoring or by a formalized 
invitation to apply in a process instituted by the Human Resources Division as visualized 
in the objectives under the Place goal.  While the preferred method of filling the FBI 
leadership pipeline would be to develop a culture of leadership whereby individuals 
desire to participate in the FBI’s management and leadership program, during times the 
FBI is having difficulty filling entry level supervisory positions, the option of drafting the 
highest potentials could be explored as those individuals would already be identified 
across the FBI. 
Goal number two or Select deals with the establishment of mechanisms to move 
from an application based selection process to one that is evaluation based.  The 
objectives for Select include developing a validated process that adds recommendations 
from outside the FBI, important in the post-9/11 Bureau given the new partnerships the 
FBI has forged, an interview process and more emphasis on performance appraisals as an 
indicator of future performance as measurable objectives toward the improvement of the 
selection process used for FBI leaders. 
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The third goal or Develop seeks to improve the qualifications of the FBI Special 
Agent leadership corps by emphasizing training and education programs and linking 
them to on-the-job experiences.  This effectively creates an organizational learning 
culture where life-long learning is encouraged and is a pre-requisite for future 
advancement.  The objectives or benchmarks toward achieving the goal include 
increasing the professional leadership development education FBI Special Agent leaders 
receive.  Most leadership scholars believe leaders gain the most from spending about ten 
percent of their time in education or training programs.  In a twenty year career, this 
equates to approximately two years worth of education and training for FBI leaders. 
Currently, the FBI leadership development programs fall far short of reaching the ten 
percent benchmark.  Most Army Officers spend two and a half to three years in various 
mandated leadership development education and training programs.  Including new 
agents training, FBI Special agent leaders currently spend around six months or 
approximately one quarter of the recommended time engaged in professional 
development education and training programs.  Significantly increasing the amount of 
time dedicated to training and educating FBI Special Agent leaders is necessary if the 
organization is going to professionalize its leadership corps.  Such programs will enhance 
the base line of knowledge for all FBI leaders and will serve to bring up the level of 
ability for the lowest common denominator.  It would also help meet requirements for 
certification of FBI leaders as intelligence officers.  Moving away from focusing on the 
high performers and making a larger investment in the mid and lower level performers in 
the organization will drive the FBI to a higher level of overall leadership proficiency.  
While the FBI is world renowned for the executive management programs it 
designs and puts on for police executives, it does not mirror these programs for its own 
executives.  Currently, FBI Special Agent leaders are required to attend a one week 
Supervisor’s Development Institute at the GS-14 level, a two week Executive 
Development Institute at the GS-15 level and a three day Navigating Strategic Change 
Seminar at the Kellogg School.  Other educational opportunities exist for FBI Special 
Agent leaders but are not required for advancement and are not currently heavily 
weighted during the application assessment process.  The FBI needs to significantly 
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expand its training and education for its executives and should consider developing a 
comprehensive leadership academy based upon the FBI National Academy or the British 
Command College models.  It should also provide opportunities for leaders to build on 
education and training with linked on-the-job experiences.  Special Agent leaders who 
are selected for sabbatical or other education programs should have a utilization tour 
attached to the completion of their program. 
The next goal will Place FBI Special Agent leaders in assignments that will help 
meet the needs of the FBI while further developing the skills of individual leaders.  This 
will be managed by a newly created Career Counseling and Placement Unit in the Human 
Resources Branch charged with conducting career counseling, tracking the progress of 
high potential and high performing leaders and matching the skills of the workforce with 
the needs of the organization.  This unit will conduct succession planning, ensuring there 
is a steady stream of qualified applicants for each level of leadership. 
Finally, the leadership pipeline will require each leader be Evaluated at every 
level in a fair and transparent manner that provides feedback and developmental 
opportunities.  To do this the current tiered performance appraisal system will need to be 
modified so senior raters are required to provide a profile of high potential and high 
performing subordinate leaders.  The evaluation process should also be linked to specific 
competencies for the level the leader is operating at as well as for the next level of 
leadership.  Each of the goals and objectives highlighted in the above chart can be 
quantified by the human resources division as a benchmark to evaluate the efficacy of the 
proposed strategic change.  Periodic review of the new policy will allow the FBI to 
modify or change its leadership development practices depending upon the value added 
to the organization by the new system.  Benchmarking provides a method to calculate or 
measure the impact the proposed strategic change is having on the organization. 
It should be noted that Figure 6 does not constitute the breadth of benchmarking 
used to evaluate the leadership pipeline, but rather serves as a starting point.  In fact, all 
of the proposed ideas in the preceding pages should be evaluated in the context of starting 
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V. RECOMMENDATION FOR STRATEGIC CHANGE 
The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees 
opportunity in every difficulty. 
        -Winston Churchill 
 
A. LOOKING BEYOND TRANSACTIONS 
The reality of the post 9/11 Federal Bureau of Investigation is one of ongoing 
transactional and transformational change.  Changes are occurring incrementally and 
through sweeping, enterprise-wide shifts in the way the FBI conducts business.  These 
changes are being driven internally by FBI executives who understand the urgency 
required to navigate the FBI’s strategic shift from a domestically focused, case and fact 
driven, predominantly law enforcement culture to a much more agile, threat and 
intelligence driven, globally focused and fully integrated culture of law enforcement and 
national security excellence.  The FBI of today must be able to effectively and 
simultaneously address such diverse threats as hostile intelligence services, diffuse global 
terrorist organizations, and transnational criminal enterprises.  Imagine the complexity of 
a leadership position that requires an individual to understand, effectively prioritize, and 
address in a timely manner hostile intelligence services working on behalf of the 
governments of China, North Korea, Russia, and others who seek to steal our 
technologies, infiltrate our government, and undermine the strategic advantages enjoyed 
by the United States.  Now imagine adding the threat posed by global terrorist 
organizations such as al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hizballah or domestic terrorist groups who 
seek to use violence to force social and political change.  Finally, add transnational 
criminal enterprises and networks such as La Cosa Nostra, Russian, and Asian criminal 
enterprises and South American drug cartels to the list of the most egregious threats faced 
by American society and you have a set of interesting problems and challenges for the 
FBI supervisor, manager, and executive.  Are we simply expecting too much from the 
FBI and its leadership?  Given the current manner and means the organization utilizes to 
staff its leadership ranks, is the FBI setting conditions for its own success?  The FBI 
needs to re-evaluate its leadership practices and develop a systematic approach toward 
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professionalizing and developing excellence in its leadership corps.  This is the only way 
the FBI can hope to address the varied and diverse challenges presented in today’s 
operating environment. 
In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the 
Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and related Agencies, FBI  
Director Robert Mueller captured the essence of what FBI leaders now face as well as the 
underlying ethos that has allowed the FBI to continue to adequately pursue emerging 
national threats when he stated: 
The culture of the FBI is now and always has been a culture of hard work, 
integrity, and dedication to protecting the United States, no matter what 
challenges we face.  The FBI was created 96 years ago to fight the spread 
of traditional crime across county and state lines.  Today’s FBI faces a 
world in which crimes as diverse as terrorism, corporate fraud, identity 
theft, human trafficking, illegal weapons trade, and money laundering 
traverse easily back and forth across international boundaries.  Today, we 
are dealing with organized crime groups that launder money for drug 
groups, which sell weapons to terrorists, who commit white collar crimes 
to fund their operations.  In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, it 
became clear the FBI must be more flexible, agile, and mobile in the face 
of these new threats.82 
It is undeniable that the FBI has made great effort toward attempting to transform 
itself in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy.  It is equally clear the work is not yet finished. 
The FBI has become more focused on its changing mission and has re-prioritized its 
investigative functions and realigned its workforce to effectively address its stated 
priorities.  It has shifted its managerial and operational environment from one of 
decentralized planning and operations in the field to centralized planning and operations 
at FBIHQ with decentralized execution occurring in the field.  The Bureau  has shown a 
willingness to look hard at its practices and to make changes in line with the desires of 
various external stakeholders, specifically the Congress of the United States and the 
eleven separate committees of Congress that have oversight responsibilities for the FBI. 
To that end, the FBI has undertaken dozens of projects to re-engineer its practices and 
                                                 
82 Robert Mueller (Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), “Testimony before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
Judiciary, and related Agencies March 23, 2004,” 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/mueller032304.htm [Accessed January 10, 2007]. 
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processes at the behest of various committees, panels, and recommendations from such 
diverse organizations as the Government Accountability Office, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the National Academy of Public Administration, various 
contractors such as the RAND Corporation, Science Applications International 
Corporation, LMI, Arthur Anderson, and others. 
Senator John Rockefeller, the newly appointed Chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee expressed concern about the role of FBI management during 
recently held hearings relating to FBI reform when he stated: 
…A related issue has to do with the experience, the expertise of FBI 
management. Much has been made about the turnover at the highest levels 
of the FBI, but what about the lower and mid levels of management, 
particularly at the headquarters level, those who are supposed to be 
guiding and supporting FBI field offices? …Does this level of the FBI’s 
management ranks have the appropriate expertise, especially in 
international counterterrorism to perform their duties?  Are the mid to 
senior ranks of the FBI being given the right incentives to come to FBI 
headquarters, and to stick around long enough to help guide the FBI’s 
national security and intelligence activities?83 
Senator Rockefeller’s concerns are not unfounded, nor do they represent 
previously undiscovered issues.  The National Academy of Public Administration 
concluded in a September 2005 report that while the FBI recognized a significant 
obstacle to its transformation efforts was an unwieldy human capital program and that the 
Bureau had taken steps to address the problem, including the revision of the FBI’s 
strategic human capital plan, more needed to be done.  Moreover, NAPA provided a ten 
step roadmap as a solution to the FBI’s ongoing leadership woes.  The steps in NAPA’s 
roadmap included84: 
• Appoint a human capital implementation team. 
• Create a chief human capital office and officer. 
• Develop a strategic workforce and planning process. 
                                                 
83 John D. Rockefeller (Chairman), “Testimony to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing 
on January 23, 2007 concerning Reform of the FBI and Department of Homeland Security,” 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress07/ [Accessed January 29, 2007]. 
84 Thornburgh, et al., Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital Program, xiii-
xix. 
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• Establish a leadership development and planning program. 
• Develop a communications and employee involvement strategy. 
• Increase the priority for information technology support to human capital 
programs. 
• Address hiring issues. 
• Initiate a comprehensive pay study. 
• Develop a structured career development and training program. 
• Provide consistent work-life processes and programs. 
The FBI has taken many of the suggestions made by NAPA to heart and 
successfully made incremental changes. In doing so the FBI has set the stage to move 
from making incremental or transactional changes to improve the way it conducts 
business toward transforming the methods and means the FBI uses to identify, select, 
professionally develop, place, and evaluate its Special Agent leadership corps as part of 
an overarching leadership strategy. 
One example of the changes implemented within the FBI flowing from the NAPA 
report and setting the stage for truly transformational change is the creation of the Human 
Resources Branch headed by an Executive Assistant Director (EAD).  This change 
created an organizational structure that combines human capital management 
responsibilities and authorities previously shared among nine different offices and by 
placing it under an EAD (one of five in the FBI), underscored the commitment the FBI 
has to its employees by elevating in importance the human resources functions of the 
FBI.  The reorganization provides the FBI with the capacity to identify strategic issues, 
determine potential courses of actions or outcomes to successfully address the issues, and 
effectively and efficiently execute human capital initiatives and plans.  This structural 
change in the FBI potentially removes a major obstacle to previous efforts to institute 
change in the FBI’s human capital program. 
The ten steps suggested by NAPA represent incremental and transactional 
solutions to the FBI’s leadership problems.  Taken together these ten steps may lead to 
transformational change and if many of them are effectively applied, they will most 
certainly set better conditions for transformation.  However, with regard to the specific 
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tasks of identifying, selecting, developing, placing and evaluating Special Agent leaders, 
they serve more as loose directions, than the roadmap report implies.  The ten steps 
provide a general idea of the direction of travel the FBI should take and an idea of what 
its final destination should be.  It does not provide turn-by-turn instructions on how to get 
to the destination and once the FBI arrives at the destination it is possible the Bureau will 
find an empty lot.  Once there, the FBI will need to construct a lasting leadership 
structure.  Where is the materials list or instructions for designing and building an 
enduring leadership system within the FBI? Perhaps the FBI needs a more of a blueprint 
and less of a roadmap. 
The steps outlined in the NAPA report are broad ranging and apply to the full 
spectrum of FBI supervisors, managers, and executives, both in the Special Agent ranks 
and in the non-agent leadership population.  The steps are generic to the organization and 
do not specifically address problems inherent to the FBI’s Special Agent leadership 
cadre.  That is not to suggest that the FBI needs to maintain a strict separation between 
the functions of a Special Agent leader and other leaders in the FBI, it merely means 
Special Agents have a very unique job function within the FBI.  Certainly the FBI needs 
to get away from previous practices of differentiating between “Agents” and “Support.” 
The FBI needs to emphasize the “One Team, One Fight” concept in its future approaches 
to conducting its mission and recognize the value each function brings to the overall and 
integrated team.  The primary difference between leaders in the FBI’s Special Agent 
ranks and leaders within the larger organization that supports an argument for change 
specific to Special Agent leaders is that while FBI leaders in other career functions such 
as computer and technologies specialists, scientists, human resources experts, legal 
experts, linguists, office managers, and the like, can either be grown from within the FBI 
or recruited and hired from outside the organization.  Special Agent leaders on the other 





To that end, the FBI should move from its current system of individual career 
management for its Special Agent leaders to a system of organizational professional 
development. What needs to occur for conditions to be set for the FBI to undergo such an 
organizational change? 
Moving the FBI from an “As Is” model of individual career management to a “To 
Be” model of organizational professional development or a “Leadership Pipeline” will 
require a new way of thinking about the leadership progression of FBI Special Agents. 
The current way of thinking ties leadership at all levels to eight rather generic core 
competencies identified as: (1) Leadership, (2) Interpersonal Abilities, (3) Liaison, (4) 
Organizing and Planning, (5) Problem Solving/Judgment, (6) Adaptability/Flexibility, (7) 
Initiative, and (8) Communications. Special Agent leaders are required to pass a 
Leadership Skills Assessment (LSA) test at both the GS-14 and GS-15 levels.  They must 
also obtain professional development education by attending a one-week long 
Supervisor’s Development Institute (SDI) course at the GS-14 level, a two-week long 
Executive Development Institute (EDI) course at the GS-15 level, and a three-day 
Kellogg school seminar on navigating strategic change.  This one-size-fits-all approach to 
competencies does not account for the different knowledge, skills, and abilities required 
for success at the various levels of GS-14, GS-15, and SES for FBI Special Agent 
leadership, nor does it set conditions for the FBI to effectively develop leaders for the 
next level of responsibility.  Leaders are not evaluated for their potential to function at the 
next higher level, but are instead evaluated on their performance based on metrics for the 
current level.  The organization has not identified and benchmarked behaviors and skills 
at each level so that high performers who are exhibiting behaviors and skills in line with 
those required for success at the next higher level are easily identified. 
An alternative method for evaluating leadership development options has been 
suggested by leadership consultant H. Skipton Leonard. Leonard advocates two lines of 
inquiry: 
Does the organization have effective leadership now and does it have a full 
“pipeline” of leaders for the future?  If not, where are the current and future gaps in 
leadership capabilities?  What skills are required to fill these gaps? 
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How do people best learn complex skills like leadership?  What is the evidence a 
particular development technique or intervention will have the desired impact?  What are 
the best ways to evaluate the success of leadership development programs? 
Leonard’s approach assumes leadership is vital to the success of the organization 
and different gaps and learning needs require different solutions.85   A debate within the 
FBI concerning the strategic value of leadership development programs would be 
valuable as the FBI requires high functioning leaders at the supervisory (GS-14), 
managerial (GS-15), and executive (SES) levels. 
One model or size does not fit all as argued by leadership consultants and authors 
Ram Charon, Stephen Drotter, and James Noel.  Charon, Drotter, and Noel make the case 
in their book, “The Leadership Pipeline” that careers move through different phases or 
stages and each passage in the pipeline brings different challenges and therefore requires 
different skills to successfully navigate a career moving from managing oneself to 
leading an organization.  The authors argue the development of a “Leadership Pipeline” 
helps focus developmental opportunities, allows organizations to gauge the readiness of 
an employee to move up in the organization through demonstration they have mastered 
the skills required for success at the current level while exhibiting some of the traits, 
skills, and behaviors required for success at the next higher level.  This pipeline 
development helps focus developmental opportunities so that leaders at all levels are 
developed to their maximum potentials, and facilitates succession planning.  Selection 
becomes more objective rather than being based upon past performances, individual 
connections, or personal preferences.  Finally, Charon, Drotter, and Noel argue the most 
significant contribution of the “Leadership Pipeline” is that it allows the organization to 
develop leaders internally.86 
Given the uniqueness of the FBI Special Agent career path, it follows that all 
Special Agent leaders need to grown from within the organization.  So how does the FBI 
                                                 
85 H. Skipton Leonard, “When Leadership Development Fails Managers: Addressing the Right Gaps 
When Developing Leadership,” in Filling the Leadership Pipeline, ed. Robert B. Kaiser (Greensboro, N.C.: 
Center for Creative Leadership, 2005), 71. 
86 Ram Charon, Stephen Drotter, and James Noel, The Leadership Pipeline: How to Build the 
Leadership Powered Company (San Francisco, CA: Josey Bass Inc., 2001) 30-31. 
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institute a strategic plan that moves the Bureau’s leadership development program from 
one that is managed by the individual to one where the organization takes a greater role in 
moving the emerging leader through a leadership pipeline that will successfully identify, 
competitively select, professionally develop, accurately evaluate, and effectively place its 
leaders? 
Some would argue that the steps the FBI has taken to adopt recommendations 
made by NAPA, GAO, and others is proof the FBI is moving away from individual 
career management and investing in the future of its leaders.  They would point to the 
creation of the Human Resources Branch, the use of Leadership Skills Assessment testing 
and short term programs such as the eighteen month temporary duty program for term 
supervisors or the five year up or out alternative for sitting supervisors, alternate career 
path program, re-institution of a tiered performance appraisal system and developmental 
opportunities such as mandatory attendance at the Kellogg School’s “Managing Strategic 
Change” course as benchmarks toward successful leadership development efforts in the 
FBI. 
Another issue of concern with the FBI’s Special Agent leadership ranks is the 
percentage of growth.  During the past ten years, the FBI Special Agent leadership has 
grown from approximately one quarter of the total Special Agent population to just under 
one-third. It has increased by 62% overall, with a 71% increase in mid-level managers at 
the GS-14 and GS-15 levels.  There has been a marked increase in the number of GS-15’s 
with less than ten years of experience and the FBI’s hollow work year issues caused by 
the authorization of leadership positions without a concurrent increase in funding has 
started to pressure the FBI’s budget.  To that end, the FBI should look at each of its 
leadership positions and try to right size the organization to meet its operational demands. 
Thirty percent of the FBI agent population in leadership positions is excessive for an 
organization the size of the FBI. 
While the FBI has attempted to initiate change and move in the right direction, its 
efforts are akin to treating the symptoms rather than curing the disease.  They simply do 
not go far enough and represent transactional solutions that replace one thing or way of  
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doing business with another.  In fact, many of these short term fixes, while done with the 
good intention of furthering the overall capabilities of the FBI, may have had some 
unintended negative consequences. 
One example is the “Up or Out” program requiring field supervisors to move up 
to a higher level of responsibility assignment at FBI headquarters or return to 
investigative duties after five years.  This policy did not take into account the different 
developmental rates of individual supervisors or the fact that some supervisors impacted 
may be performing at their highest potential grade level.  The NAPA report observes that 
while this policy was designed to have a positive effect by broadening experience and 
individual capabilities, and filling vacancies at headquarters; its role in leadership 
development or succession planning was not clearly explained.  Moreover, 
implementation of the program was met with unrest and created issues that had an 
adverse effect on families, compensation and retirement benefits.87  
This policy and the implementation of the eighteen-month term supervisor 
program that ostensibly brought field supervisors and Special Agents to headquarters as a 
developmental experience on an eighteen-month “term” or temporary duty assignment 
helped fill manning requirements at entry level supervisory positions at FBIHQ, but on 
further examination, their implementation may have had the unintended consequence of 
eroding the culture of trust that must exist between executives and subordinates in any 
high performing organization.  And as Kendrick has observed, the policy may have 
developed a caste system among supervisors. 
 In the case of the “Up or Out” policy, many of the supervisors impacted were 
among the most experienced field supervisors in the FBI.  They had competed for their 
positions with the understanding that as “stationary” supervisors, they could stay in the 
assignment and serve at their current grade until retirement.  Some had no desire to move 
beyond the position they were in and were continuing to contribute to the success of the 
FBI in meaningful ways.  The “Up or Out” policy was enforced retroactively and there 
was no grandfather provision allowing supervisors who obtained their positions before 
the Bureau practice was changed to remain in their jobs. While the policy did create                                                  
87 Thornburgh, Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital Plan, 13.  
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movement and set conditions for supervisors to move up rather than return to 
investigative duties, several experienced leaders stepped down and in doing so faced 
adverse impacts in terms of salary and retirement benefits.  Since the policy was 
implemented, through 1/29/2007, 280 FBI supervisors have been impacted.  A review of 
the results of the policy has determined 145 of the 280 supervisors decided to advance or 
take lateral assignments at FBIHQ.  Over 48 percent or 135 supervisors decided to retire 
or to step down rather than accept an assignment at FBI headquarters.88   Of greater 
concern than the loss of this number of experienced leaders, and the ethical and legal 
issues relative to forcing superior performing supervisors to leave their jobs, is the 
potential adverse impact this policy may have on future generations of agents 
contemplating voluntary service in the Special Agent leadership ranks.  Many would-be 
volunteers may eschew leadership positions if they believe policies and practices could 
be changed in manners that would hurt them financially or create hardships for their 
families. Any culture of leadership excellence must be accompanied by a culture of trust 
between managers at all levels as well as between leaders and those who are led. 
Adding to the erosion of trust between FBI executives and mid-level managers 
and supervisors was the recent decision to suspend temporary duty benefits for those 
supervisors and Special Agents who opted to take term assignments to FBIHQ.  While on 
the surface, this may have been a prudent cost saving step, it effectively changed the 
rules.  Many of the temporary duty term supervisors or “scabs” as they are affectionately 
known, had no intention to stay in the leadership pipeline, but saw the opportunity to not 
only make a significant amount of money while in a temporary duty status (estimated to 
be around $72,000.00), but to also permanently obtain a higher pay grade and step upon 
their return to the field due to pay retention legislation. While the temporary duty 
program appeared to have a financial benefit to the Bureau, in that $72,000.00 is cheaper 
than the estimated $80,000.00-85,000.00 for a permanent transfer, this did not take into 
account the long-term costs to the FBI in salaries and benefits paid to the term 
supervisors at a much higher rate during the remainder of their careers and into their 
retirements.  Such initiatives also encourage people to volunteer for the wrong reasons. 
                                                 
88 Bennett, interview. 
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While financial incentives may serve as an enticement to serve at the next higher level, 
they should come with an expectation the individual will stay in the leadership pipeline.   
And while the organization may have been justified in suspending the temporary 
duty benefits or changing the rules concerning those benefits; to those impacted it had the 
same appearance as the “up or out” policy, where the rules were changed and what you 
had as an expectation when you volunteered to step up and take a leadership job is 
subject to change at the whim of executive management.  The combination of these 
events will likely serve as further disincentives for Special Agents considering voluntary 
advancement to the supervisory level.  Ironically, any short-term gains made in keeping 
the voluntary leadership system full may be offset by the deleterious impact these 
decisions have had on potential future volunteers.  Why would anyone want to enter a 
system where the only constant is change?  How can subordinate leaders trust an 
executive hierarchy that acts unpredictably and in a manner inconsistent with providing 
actual incentives for advancement? 
Prophetically, leadership consultant Jeanette Swist once opined, “Organizations 
have difficulties in implementing lasting improvements because they focus on the 
technical side and short term issues.  There is a tendency to disregard the human side and 
the larger system perspective.”89  Perhaps the FBI would be better served if it adopted a 
longer view of its Special Agent leadership issues and made incremental or transactional 
changes that set conditions for a whole systems approach representing something truly 
transformational. 
What is preventing the FBI from moving beyond transactional fixes to its 
leadership issues?  What organizational hurdles exist that must be negotiated before the 
conditions for transformation can exist?  In their international bestseller Blue Ocean 
Strategy, authors W. Chan Kim and Renee Manborgne identify the four organizational 
hurdles of strategy execution as cognitive, resources, motivational, and political.90  
Overcoming these hurdles requires they be identified in the context of the strategic 
                                                 
89 Jeanette Swist, “Consulting Windowpanes: Addressing the Challenges of Executing Change,” 
http://shrm.org/hrresources/whitepapers_published/cms_000227.asp [Accessed February 21, 2006]. 
90 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 52. 
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change proposal to move the FBI from its current or “As Is” system of individual career 
management to a future or “To Be” system of organizational professional development. 
Figure 7 depicted below graphically details the four organizational hurdles of strategy 
execution as forces working both for and against the proposed strategic change: 
 
 
Figure 7. Change Forces 
 
Clearly, the problem is being recognized by the FBI as evidenced by the 
implementation of such incremental changes such as the creation of a Human Resources 
Branch; combining human resource functions previously spread over nine separate 
organizations.  Other transactions have included the validation and implementation of 
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Leadership Skills Assessment (LSA) testing at the GS-14 and GS-15 grade levels to 
identify future leaders and as a prerequisite for entry into the management ranks, a new 
focus on change management as evidenced by mandatory attendance by GS-14 and GS-
15 personnel at the Kellogg School, “Navigating Strategic Change” course and the use of 
various new programs and policies such as the five year “up or out” policy or eighteen 
month term supervisory temporary duty (TDY) program at FBIHQ to create movement in 
the mid-level management ranks and entice agents to come to FBIHQ. 
Mike Ferrence offers a comprehensive explanation concerning the difficulties of 
creating an overarching leadership system when he offers, 
There are several impediments to making changes in the way the FBI 
identifies, selects, professionally develops, evaluates, and places it leaders. 
The first deals with the entire human process of dealing with change.  
With each existing situation there are a number of individuals who will 
benefit with the status quo, another group of individuals who would 
benefit from specific changes as they see it, and two other groups who are 
connected to those who are in power or will move into positions of power. 
There two power forces work to main the system the way it is or to change 
it to their liking.  What may be lacking is an honest, informed broker, who 
holds the institution above all else.  This individual or group is hard to 
find.  Further, if the individual or group is identified, are they still open to 
other ideas that are inconsistent with their own experiences or points of 
view. 
The second impediment is that when we look for change we look external 
to the organization.  We look for people who have been successful, or 
appear to be successful, in other organizations, to show us the way.  These 
individuals bring in new systems that have worked for them at a different 
place and at a different time.  The executive who court and hire these 
individuals tend to suggest the FBI is broken, fix us as you did at IBM, 
IRS, BP, etc.  They give them no time to understand how their past 
experience may be similar or different from the FBI.  They give the 
impression that everything we are doing is wrong rather than we are doing 
some things right and some things wrong.   
Case in Point, several years ago the FBI brought in an executive from 
IBM, Bob Dyes to fix our technology systems base on his excellent track 
record of dealing with what was perceived to be similar situations in the 




along in having better technology systems than when he arrived.  We had 
something different, but different and better are not necessarily 
synonymous. 
In the HR area we brought in a number of individuals from the 
Department of Defense who attempted to ‘install’ the military model of 
personnel development.  Three to four years later they were asked to 
leave, or strongly encouraged to do so, after an inspection finding that they 
were manipulating the hiring data to make themselves look good relative 
to the goals and objectives they said they could achieve.  They brought 
with them a model of mergers and acquisition that said break everything 
down in to parts, throw out parts that don’t produce, get rid of individuals 
who are not loyal to you personally, and promote those that are loyal to 
positions of power and authority even if they do not have the expertise to 
lead the work unit. 
In the Training Division, we hired an individual from the IRS who 
engineered a leadership development system based on core competencies. 
In his effort to ‘transform’ the FBI to his successful prior system, he failed 
to understand the short falls of competency systems, believed everything 
that was being done was totally wrong, was not open to any advice about 
the organizational culture, and could not communicate with our law 
enforcement working partners.  He was a very bright man, with many 
good ideas and success that may have made a positive difference if he had 
created a partnership with the existing Leadership Development staff to 
take what was working well and to add his insight and experiences to 
create a new development system that would have been transformative by 
utilizing some transactional interventions.  This leads me to conclude, in 
this case, that it is important to balance out transformative systems with 
transactional decisions.  All transactions are not bad and all transformative 
initiatives are not all good. 
I believe one of the most serious impediments to change in the 
identification, selection, development and placement of individuals who 
would lead this organization is the unknown of what a professional, well 
grounded, objective system would produce.  Would it produce an 
individual with a profile inconsistent with the current leaders?  Would it 
identify flaws in our hiring practices to include our diversified programs, 
the hiring of particular professional groups (i.e. lawyers, accountants, 
scientists, etc.?  Would it run counter to court decisions and law suit 
settlements? 
Lastly, I would consider what gets rewarded internally and where are the 
pressures externally.  Leadership development is not a high priority, 
whereas solving cases, preventing terrorism, and collecting intelligence is. 
How often does Congress, specially those committees and sub-committees 
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who provide oversight and funding, want to know how we hire, develop, 
evaluate and reward leadership as compared to questions on intelligence 
failures, employees gone bad, technology issues, and how are we 
protecting whistle blowers (who are at times some of our worst employees 
that we can not fire).91 
Still, one of the factors against transformational change is that the FBI’s leaders 
and managers appear wedded to transactional solutions.  They are problem solvers by 
nature and tend to think in terms of the immediate challenge, sometimes without looking 
at the long term effects or unintended consequences.  Examination of the eighteen month 
temporary duty program to allows a fuller understanding of this dynamic. 
The program was initiated to provide developmental opportunities to FBI Special 
Agents through an eighteen month temporary duty tour at FBIHQ, while eliminating a 
major barrier to service at FBIHQ, that being the impacts of moving a family to the high 
cost Washington D.C. metropolitan area.  The candidates selected were to be paid full per 
diem during their tenure at Headquarters and given a term GS-14 rank for the duration of 
their assignment.  The program also helped fill critical staffing needs at FBIHQ and on its 
surface seemed like a good idea.  It also appeared to be cost efficient as the total cost for 
the temporary duty tour was estimated at approximately $72,000.00 compared to an 
average cost of $85,000.00 to transfer an employee to FBIHQ. 
The program had several unintended consequences including a deleterious impact 
the program had on field division operations.  Many of the volunteers who were selected 
for the program were among the most senior and most productive agents in the field. 
Losing the experience of these agents without any backfill of resources created gaps in 
the ability of field divisions to execute their operations at the same level of competence.  
Additionally, the solution offered an eighteen month stop-gap measure that turned out to 
be more expensive for the organization than originally intended. 
The current budget environment has seen a Congress willing to invest in the long-
term health of the FBI.  While this suggests additional resources, particularly funding, 
may be available for the FBI to invest in long term solutions or long range goals, real or 
perceived fiscal irresponsibility may quickly negate any gains.  Furthermore, the reality is 
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that funding is not unlimited and the current federal deficit does not bode well for the 
future.  Additionally, Congress wants to see tangible results, so FBI organizational 
investments that are geared toward the short-term are more likely to receive funding.  
This leads to budget conditions more favorable to transactional solutions rather than 
transformational change. 
There are certainly some dedicated, forward-thinking leaders and managers in the 
FBI who have championed and continue to advocate the concept of developing a 
leadership pipeline.  This is not a new idea and when it has surfaced in the past, it has 
invariably run up against senior staff who are satisfied with the status quo and who are 
not only overwhelmed by competing short-term goals and priorities, but who have 
themselves benefited from rising within the current system of individual career 
management.  Many of these leaders see criticism of the status quo as an attack on their 
leadership and are therefore less than enthusiastic about driving the change. 
Finally, the politics surrounding change is complicated with external stakeholders 
such as Congress, GAO, NAPA and the American Public all advocating the FBI 
implement sweeping organizational change.  This is balanced against powerful special 
interest groups and individuals who are resistant to change or who have their own visions 
of what and how change should be implemented.  Interestingly, these powerful self-
interested or special interest groups can potentially become powerful facilitators or 
instruments of change. 
An example of such a group that has become an agent for change for the FBI is a 
group of African American agents known as “Black Agents Don’t Get Equality” or 
BADGE.  The BADGE group successfully sued the FBI in order to force the Bureau to 
revamp its promotional system for all Special Agent mid-level management positions. 
The lawsuit and a binding legal settlement subsequently required the Bureau to utilize 
specific assessment tools to identify and select mid-level leaders and managers at the GS-
14 and GS-15 grade levels.  The assessment tools selected included a Leadership Skills 




business reasoning test followed by a verbal role playing exercise in which candidates act 
in a supervisory capacity at the appropriate level and are scored against the eight 
identified core leadership competencies.  
While the BADGE litigation hoped to provide a mechanism to assist individuals 
interested in serving at mid-level leadership and managerial positions in the FBI, the 
lawsuit settlement legally bound the Bureau to implement the use of this process without 
conducting much research into the use of assessment tools.  Fortunately, the presiding 
Federal Court views the assessment tools as acceptable and in a 1995 article for Public 
Personnel Management journal, authors G.F. Coulton and Hubert S. Field determine 
federal courts have traditionally viewed assessment centers as a preferred technique 
toward remedying discrimination in human resource decisions, particularly those 
concerning race and gender issues.92 
The use of these tools may suggest the FBI is on the right track, however, the 
implementation of the LSA has been far from perfect.  First, the use of the occupational 
personality and business reasoning or written portion of the test was suspended, leading 
many of the rank and file Special Agents who took the test to question the validity of the 
testing process.  Shortly after the decision was made to abandon the written portion of the 
test, approximately 200 individuals who had taken and passed the test, were told their 
results no longer met the passing threshold and that they now had failing scores.  While 
the reasons behind suspending the written assessment and re-aligning the test scores may 
have been valid and made perfect organizational sense, the glitches in the implementation 
of the LSA have had an undeniable negative impact on the trust emerging leaders place in 
their senior executives.  The perceived “changing of the rules” after the assessments were 
conducted raises serious ethical and possible legal issues. 
Moreover, the FBI rushed to implement a transactional fix to a legitimate problem 
that was identified well in advance by the BADGE litigants and ordered by the Court to 
be repaired by a specific date.  The FBI did so admittedly without conducting the 
appropriate research or without placing the changed processes into the context of a larger 
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leadership development framework.  They simply fixed the identified problem and in 
doing so created additional unintended consequences, the results of which remain to be 
seen. 
Bestselling author Malcolm Gladwell suggests in his book, “The Tipping Point,” 
the possibility that sudden change occurs at the center of that point or moment where an 
issue reaches critical mass and “tips” toward sweeping, meaningful, or transformational 
change.  Gladwell describes that point where radical change becomes more than a 
possibility and moves toward becoming a certainty.  He looks at epidemics as a model of 
how changes start and examines those points where a movement, good idea, solution to a 
problem or next great thing gets started.  Gladwell concludes starting epidemics requires 
first concentrating resources in a few key areas.93 
What if the BADGE lawsuit had been looked at differently?  Suppose the issues 
identified by the BADGE litigants had been reframed as a strategic issue for the entire 
FBI rather than viewed in the context of a tightly focused, targeted problem in need of an 
immediate solution? 
With the clarity of hindsight, it is easy to see the BADGE lawsuit had the 
potential to become a “tipping point” for FBI leadership as it brought together external 
stakeholders such as the Department of Justice and the Courts and powerful internal 
stakeholders in the form of the BADGE litigants to identify systemic problems in the 
manner and means utilized by the FBI to identify and select its Special Agent mid-level 
leaders and managers.  It also dealt with diversity issues and for the FBI to be an effective 
representative of the American public, it must mirror the diversity of the public it serves. 
There was an unseen opportunity to leverage these powerful change agents as “tipping 
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B. A POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR LEADERSHIP 
TRANSFORMATION 
Comprehensive, long-term solutions are never easy.  They typically require a 
great deal of effort and resources to implement.  Furthermore, FBI Special Agents are by 
their very nature adept at short-term problem solving.  They are hired because of 
demonstrated autonomy and because they are self-directed.  Their roles after being hired 
require them to very quickly and logically find solutions to broad ranging problems.  
They are good at finding holes in cases, building arguments based upon statutory 
requirements, and working in ever-changing, fast-paced environments where their 
decisions may have tremendous consequences up to and including the difference between 
life and death.  They intuitively understand how to identify and address specific problems 
while expending a minimum of effort, time, and expense. 
FBI Agents are much less adept or comfortable facing abstract problems requiring 
dramatic exponential change.  They don’t always recognize the implications of their 
short-term solutions.  They typically default to behaviors such as short-term problem 
solving skills that have led to individual and organizational success.  They often have 
trouble seeing the benefits of long-term change. 
Given that dynamic, what must occur to set conditions for those few individuals 
and entities or “tipping points” within and external to the FBI holding the power to drive 
change and tip transformation to create an epidemic of transformational change in the 
Bureau’s leadership methods?  If the FBI is not performing as well as it should, is in need 
of change; and you accept that the key to long-term or strategic change lies in the 
Bureau’s leadership corps, how do you move the Bureau toward the strategic vision of an 
FBI “led by the finest law enforcement and national security leaders in the world?” 
Steven Kerman in writing about change in government organizations observes 
that the notion people resist change is oversimplified. Kelman argues there are typically 
two constituencies in large government organizations, one for change and one for the 
status quo.94  The dynamic suggested by Kelman most certainly exists within the FBI. 
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There are supporters of the Bureau’s “As Is” practice of individual career management 
and there are individuals who see the need for the FBI to move toward a different model 
of leadership development and placement.  Enough controversy currently exists and 
enough incremental changes are being enacted that conditions may favor initiation of a 
change process driven by interested external and key internal stakeholders.  The key to 
finding the “tipping point” suggested by Gladwell will be to think more broadly and to 
raise the level of debate so those specific shortcuts to innovative ideas concerning change 
can be rediscovered and exploited, turning the debate into an epidemic and resulting in a 
true transformation of the FBI’s leadership practices. 
Burns description of the differences between transactional and transformational 
leadership helps define the “As Is” verses the “To Be” states of the FBI with regard to its 
leadership.95 Transactional leadership is the kind of leadership the FBI has engaged in to 
cure its many ills.  It has made many changes or adjustments to the manner and 
mechanisms it uses to appease the politicos and hopefully in doing so, improve the way it 
functions.  The FBI has identified and fixed many organizational and institutional 
shortcomings, but what if the FBI did something truly transformational and altered the 
way it identifies, selects, develops, evaluates and places its future leaders.  What if the 
FBI looked at leadership as the essential system from which every other aspect or plan 
flows?  Transforming the FBI leadership lines of identification, selection, professional 
development, evaluation and placement into an interconnected, overarching system 
would secure for all time the future of one of America’s great institutions. 
Much like the United States army in the years following Vietnam, the FBI is at a 
crossroad.  Post-Vietnam, the army recognized it needed to transform.  A great deal of 
introspection occurred and in a renaissance of leadership, the army remade itself as “The 
Army of Excellence.”  It did so by embarking on a path that focused on developing 
leadership and professional leadership development was institutionalized at all levels. 
Today it is the best led army in the world. Post-9/11 the FBI would do well to emulate the 
army’s experience and fix its leadership problems first.  Here are a few suggested  
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recommendations toward transforming the FBI’s leadership through the initiation of a 
“leadership pipeline” approach to the identification, selection, professional development, 
evaluation and placement of FBI Special Agent leaders: 
• The FBI should consider the development of overarching leadership 
principles that augment the core values of the organization and serve as 
those intangibles that every leader knows and that guide every leader’s 
actions. Similar principles are used by the military with great effect.  
Developing guiding leadership principles will help create and sustain a 
leadership culture of excellence in the FBI.  A suggested set of FBI 
leadership principles (to generate discussion) follows: 
• Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions. 
• Know yourself and seek self-improvement. 
• Be honest with and never compromise your integrity. 
• Know your people and look out for their welfare. 
• Set the example by being technically proficient and never ask a 
subordinate to do something you are unable or unwilling to do 
yourself. 
• Keep your subordinates, peers and superiors informed, speak with 
frankness and candor. 
• Develop a sense of vision and focus on the bigger picture. 
• Learn to lead by being led. 
• Pay attention to the details by making sure every task is 
understood, supervised and accomplished 
• Set conditions for success by knowing your limitations and the 
limitations of your team; employ them in accordance with their 
abilities. 
• Praise in public and constructively criticize in private. 
• Be decisive. 
• All Special Agents should be required to take the Leadership Skills 
Assessment (LSA) test upon the completion of their probationary special 
agent period and completing a minimum of one year as a Special Agent.  
All SA’s will be required to take the LSA by their sixth year in the FBI. 
This will provide a baseline of leadership in the FBI and will help identify 
personnel with high leadership potential.  During periods where the FBI’s 
pool of voluntary leadership candidates does not meet organizational 
requirements, identified high performing and high potential leaders could 
be subject to involuntary promotion. 
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• Further development of a valid mechanism to identify at the 3-5 year mark 
Special Agents with the aptitude to become the FBI’s future leaders that 
goes beyond the limitations of the current LSA should be explored.  This 
mechanism should include psychological testing, and a comprehensive 
skills test such as the LSA currently in use.  All SA’s should be required to 
take the tests and be provided with feedback as a developmental tool.  
SA’s who pass the test and desire additional leadership training should 
submit an application to serve as a relief supervisor and be interviewed 
and career boarded as part of their selection as a relief or supervisor 
trainee.  Selection should come with monetary incentives such as a step 
increase. 
• Professional education should be emphasized by the organization at all 
levels and should be programmed to cover a minimum of ten percent or 
around two years worth of professional education in a twenty year career.  
Selection as a Relief Supervisor should trigger the first formal professional 
development training opportunity and require completion of combination 
distance learning, in-residence, and on-the-job training consisting of basic 
supervisory skills.  Mentoring by supervisory personnel and senior leaders 
should commence at this point.  Qualifications should be documented in a 
critical skills book in the same manner the FBI documents the acquisition 
of critical skills for probationary agents. 
• Upon successful completion of the relief supervisor’s course and at least 
one year as a relief, and upon reaching and spending one year in the grade 
of GS-13 (on the premise you have to make “agent” before you can make 
supervisor), the candidate would be eligible to compete for a slot at the 
Supervisory Development Institute or leadership academy. 
• Upon selection for the FBI Supervisory Development Institute Leadership 
Academy (SDLIA) and prior to reporting to his/her first supervisory 
assignment, the candidate should attend and successfully complete an FBI 
command college similar to the FBI National Academy or the British 
Command College, but geared towards the unique skills required by FBI 
leaders.  This school should help meet the requirements for the academic 
portion of the newly created intelligence officer certification and should 
provide at least 15 hours of graduate level credit.  The FBI should enter 
into an agreement with an accredited university to develop a program to 
allow SSA’s to continue to work on-line to obtain additional credits 
toward a master’s degree in an appropriate discipline such as national 
security studies, strategic intelligence or criminal justice management.  
Advanced education at the graduate degree level should be a pre-requisite 
for further advancement to the GS-15 level. SDILA graduates will be 
assigned to their first supervisory job based upon the needs of the FBI and 
if possible in accordance with their own desires.  Consideration should be 
given to a merit system whereby class rank determines the degree of 
choice an individual has over their first supervisory assignment. 
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• Subsequent application for supervisory jobs should require a resume and 
application detailing the candidate’s qualifications and verified by 
individuals familiar with the candidates qualifications.  An interview panel 
should be part of the selection process and the last three performance 
appraisals for the candidate should be taken into consideration.  Given the 
increased interaction by FBI personnel with outside or other agencies, 
letters of recommendation from individuals outside of the FBI should be 
considered by career boards in the future.  Psychological profiles and test 
scores for the leadership aptitude test should also be evaluated.  Past work 
related assignments in the SA’s career track of Counter-terrorism, 
Counterintelligence, Intelligence, Cyber crime, and Criminal subprograms 
should be considered as well as pre-FBI experiences, professional 
certifications, and educational background.  Selection should be evaluation 
based and placement in jobs should be prioritized with the needs of the 
Bureau coming first.  This should not be without the desires of the 
individual being expressed.  As detailed below, the FBI should develop a 
career counseling and placement center to help monitor the development 
of FBI Special Agent leaders and ensure the leadership needs of the 
organization are being effectively met. 
• All GS-14 and GS-15 assignments should have minimum term limits of 3 
years and maximum term limits of 5 years. (With possible exceptions for 
critical operations, personal hardship, or hardship tours in undesirable 
places.)  This will allow for better succession planning and continuity of 
operations and leadership within the FBI.  High performing and high 
potential leaders exhibiting traits desirable at the next level of leadership 
will be encouraged to move up earlier. 
• At the conclusion of the five year term, individuals desiring to re-compete 
for their existing assignment will be allowed to do so.  This will provide 
separate leadership pools in the leadership pipeline for individuals who 
have technical skills such as advanced teaching credentials, bomb 
technicians, laboratory scientists, etc. to remain in their positions so the 
organization can continue to benefit from their technical expertise.  It will 
also allow supervisors with existing family needs to stay in their positions 
to attend to their individual requirements without being financially harmed 
by being forced to step down. Re-competing for a job at the five year mark 
will allow bosses to make a change if they are not happy with the 
performance of the incumbent.  
• 360 degree reviews should be conducted of all FBI Special Agent leaders 
at each successive grade level (GS-14, GS-15 and SES) as a 
developmental tool and as a reality check for the individual and the 
organization.  This would help eliminate the careerist or at least separate 
him from the professional in the Special Agent leadership ranks. 
 110
• SES selections should be performance and skills based, should come with 
a minimum commitment and increased financial incentives that are 
performance based.  The entire work history of SES candidates should be 
considered and psychological testing administered to effectively place 
SES executives in the jobs they are best suited for.  There should be a 
minimum of 30 days overlap for all SES positions as part of an overall 
continuity in leadership plan. 
• All GS-15 applicants will be required to have a master’s degree or 
equivalent as an educational requirement.  Upon selection to a GS-15 
position, candidates will be required to attend an advanced command 
college or Executive Development Institute designed to prepare the 
designee for greater responsibilities.  Strategic Planning skills will be 
emphasized during the Executive Development Institute.  As is the current 
practice, EDI classes will be conducted with the entire range of FBI 
leaders, both agent and non-agent. Problem solving, program and project 
management, strategic planning, change leadership, and crisis 
management skills will be emphasized. Individual and group projects 
focused on solving organizational problems will be required. ASAC 
candidates will be required to be inspection certified. Special Agent 
positions at the GS-15 level will be awarded based upon the needs of the 
FBI and if possible in accordance with the desires of the candidates. 
• Organizational changes to manage the new “Leadership Pipeline” should 
include the creation of a Career Counseling and Staffing Unit within the 
Human Resources Branch.  This unit will forecast FBI leadership 
requirements, provide career counseling for leaders at all levels, maintain 
skills and abilities data bases in order to effectively place leaders with the 
right skills in the right jobs as manage skills required by the organization 
in rising classes of leaders, and place leaders in a manner that is best for 
the organization, helps develop individuals to their greatest potential and 
ensures there are no leadership gaps. 
• Another organizational change for consideration is the creation of a 
Knowledge and Futures Unit to manage professional development of 
Special Agent leaders and to conduct research into re-occurring and 
emerging issues of concern to the organization.  This would allow the FBI 
to be more proactive, to harness lessons learned in a meaningful way that 
can be accessed by the entire organization and to systematically seek 
solutions to organizational problems. One of the responsibilities of the 
Knowledge and Futures Branch might be to identify issues to be worked 
on as group and individual projects by attendees at EDI.  Imagine an FBI 
where rising executives are not only able to identify strategic issues, but 
have a mechanism to conduct meaningful research into finding solutions 
that can be captured and perhaps utilized by the FBI.  If the Bureau funded 
four EDI courses per fiscal year and each class worked solving two to 
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three strategic issues, the payback potential for the organization is 
exponentially great compared to the mechanisms that exist today. 
•  Finally, the FBI should look at its Special Agent leadership requirements 
and determine if all the positions currently funded are required for the 
efficient and effective running of the organization.  A Special Agent 
leadership cadre consisting of over 30 percent of the total number of 
Special Agent resources seems excessively large. 
Borrowing once again from Chan and Mauborgne, Figure 8 below described as an 
Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid96, provides an analytical framework to synopsize 
the recommendations described above in the context of actions necessary to implement 
the changes desired.  The grid forces leaders to scrutinize the factors for and against 
change and as it is fairly easy to understand, it serves as an excellent tool to generate 
additional discussion, the primary goal of this thesis.  
 
Figure 8. Grid Depicting Actions to Create an FBI Special Agent Leadership Pipeline 
(From Chan and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 2004). 
                                                 
96 Chan and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 35-36. 
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While the above recommendations are not all inclusive, they represent a potential 
investment in FBI leaders that is unmatched in the history of the organization.  They are 
proposed in the spirit of provoking thought, generating discussion and moving the FBI in 
a direction toward positive transformational change relating to its leadership corps.  They 
are pieces of the “Just One Thing” or overarching policy recommendation that the FBI 
scrap its current system of individual career management in favor of a leadership pipeline 
to create a professional FBI Special Agent leadership corps.  Taken together they 
represent the type of integrated, whole systems approach needed to improve the FBI’s 
Special Agent leadership capacity. 
As Michael Useem, Director of the Wharton School’s Center for Leadership and 
Change Management once wrote,  
…I take leadership to signify the act of making a difference.  Leadership 
entails changing a failed strategy or revamping a failing organization.  It 
requires an active choice among plausible alternatives, and it depends on 
bringing others along, on mobilizing them to get the job done.  Leadership 
is at its best when the vision is strategic, the voice persuasive, the results 
tangible.97 
If FBI leaders are going to make a difference, and in order for the Bureau to truly 
transform, the FBI must start making serious investments in the people it hopes to 
develop to lead it into the 21st century.  To do this, the FBI needs to move away from the 
current system of individual career management and develop a system of organizational 
professional development or a “leadership pipeline.” 
                                                 
97 Michael Useem, The Leadership Moment (New York: Random House, 1998), 4. 
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